TAXATION-DEPRECIATION-TAXPAYER

WHO CAN SHOW THAT AN

INTANGIBLE ASSET HAS A LIMITED USEFUL LIFE AND Is CAPABLE
OF BEING VALUED MAY DEDUCT DEPRECIATION IN DETERMINING
FEDERAL TAXABLE INCOME REGARDLESS OF THE RELATIONSHIP

OF THE ASSET TO GOODWILL-Newark

Morning Ledger Co. v.

United States, 113 S. Ct. 1670 (1993).
The deductibility of depreciation or amortization' of intangible assets for federal income tax purposes has been a source of
frequent litigation,' voluminous commentary,3 and legislative de1 "Depreciation" and "amortization" are used interchangeably herein. "Depreciation" can be defined broadly as "[a] fall in value" or a "reduction of worth." BLACK'S
LAw DICTIONARY 397 (5th ed. 1979). More specifically, depreciation is "[t]he write-off
for tax purposes of the cost or other basis of a tangible asset over its estimated useful
hat which may be felt or touched,
life." Id. "Tangible property" can be defined as "[t]
and is necessarily corporeal, although it may be real or personal. . . ." BLACK'S LAW
DIcrIONARY 1456 (6th ed. 1990) (citation omitted). "Intangible assets," on the other
hand, are "[s]uch values as accrue to a going business as goodwill, trademarks, copyrights, franchises, or the like." BLACK's LAw DICTnoNARY 726 (5th ed. 1979). Thus, an
intangible is "[p] roperty that is a 'right' rather than a physical object." Id. For intangible assets, the term "amortization" is generally preferred over "depreciation." Martin
J. Gregorcich, Amortization Of Intangibles: A Reassessment Of The Tax Treatment Of
Purchased Goodwill, 28 TAX LAw. 251, 253 (1975). Amortization is "[t]he allocation
(and charge to expense) of the cost or other basis of an intangible asset over its estimated useful life." BLACK's LAw DICioNARY 83 (6th ed. 1990). The Internal Revenue
Code and regulations thereunder, however, do not use the term "amortization," but
rather use "depreciation" when referring to both tangible and intangible assets. Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1670, 1683 n.1 (1993) (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
2 Compare Donrey, Inc. v. United States, 809 F.2d 534, 535, 537 (8th Cir. 1987)
(affirming a jury verdict allowing depreciation of a subscription list of a purchased
newspaper business); Houston Chronicle Publishing Co. v. United States, 481 F.2d
1240, 1243, 1254 (5th Cir. 1973) (allowing a deduction for depreciation of purchased
newspaper subscription list), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1129 (1974); Richard S. Miller &
Sons, Inc. v. United States, 537 F.2d 446, 449, 457 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (allowing depreciation deductions with respect to purchased insurance expirations); Colorado Nat'l
Bankshares, Inc. v. Commissioner, 60 T.C.M. (CCH) 771, 795 (1990) (allowing deductions for depreciation of deposit base of acquired banks), affd, 984 F.2d 383 (10th
Cir. 1993); Citizens & Southern Corp. v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 463, 514 (1988) (allowing depreciation of deposit base), affd per curiam, 919 F.2d 1492 (11 th Cir. 1990);
Computing & Software, Inc. v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 223, 225, 226, 232 (1975) (allowing a depreciation deduction for customer files of an acquired credit reporting
business) with Boe v. Commissioner, 307 F.2d 339, 341, 343 (9th Cir. 1962) (denying
deduction for canceled medical service contracts that were part of an acquired medical practice); Dodge Bros., Inc. v. United States, 118 F.2d 95, 98, 102 (4th Cir. 1941)
(disallowing a deduction for the loss of goodwill due to obsolescence); Red Wing
Malting Co. v. Willcuts, 8 F.2d 180, 182 (D. Minn. 1925) (denying a deduction for the
obsolescence of goodwill), affd, 15 F.2d 626 (8th Cir. 1926), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 763
(1927).
3 See, e.g., Gregorcich, supra note 1, at 251 (urging the enactment of "comprehensive legislation" addressing the tax treatment of amortization of intangible assets);
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bate4 for much of the past seventy years.5 Although the Internal
Revenue Code has permitted depreciation of intangible assets
Marc D. Levy et al., Supreme Court's Decisionon Amortizing IntangiblesRemoves One Barrier,
79J. TAx'N 4, 4 (1993) (predicting that the Supreme Court's decision in Newark MorningLedger Co. v. United States would lead to additional disputes between taxpayers and
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and that Congress would act to mitigate some of
the controversy in the area); RobertJ. McDonald, Goodwill And The FederalIncome Tax,
45 VA. L. REv. 645, 682 (1959) (proposing that essentially all intangibles be labeled
goodwill, and that amortization be allowed over the useful life of an intangible to the
extent substantiated by taxpayers, their accountants and attorneys); Alan S. Schenk,
Depreciation Of Intangible Assets: The Uncertainty Of Death And Taxes, 13 WAYNE L. REV.
501, 529 (1967) (supporting a depreciation allowance for a broader range of intangible assets); Note, An Inquiy Into The Nature Of Goodwill, 53 COLUM. L. REv. 660, 696731 (1953) (discussing broadly the tax treatment of goodwill); John L. Cleary, II,
Comment, Core Deposit Base: Goodwill Or Not Goodwill-Is That the Question?, 39 CATH.
U. L. REv. 795, 795, 829-30 (1990) (analyzing the nature of a bank's core deposit base
intangibles and contending that the presence of "certain indicia" of goodwill is irrelevant to the depreciability of the asset, provided the taxpayer can establish the asset's
useful life and ascertainable value); Comment, Depreciability Of Going Concern Value,
122 U. PA. L. REv. 484, 494, 496 (1973) (supporting depreciation of going concern
value over a useful life proven by the taxpayer); Daniel P. Meehan, Note, Core Deposit
Intangibles and Amortization: Citizens & Southern Corp. & Subsidiaries v. Commissioner, 44 TAX LAw. 577, 578, 590-593 (1991) (criticizing the Tax Court's handling of
the issue of amortization of intangible assets and proposing a "more coherent
method" for assessing amortizability).
4 Compare H.R. 3545, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (proposing that depreciation
deductions for customer-based intangibles be denied) and H.R. 563, 102d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1991) (proposing the disallowance of depreciation deductions for all customerbased intangibles) with H.R. 13, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (advocating the allowance of depreciation of essentially all intangible assets over a statutorily fixed period
of time).
The legislative debate concerning the amortization of intangible assets ended on
August 10, 1993 when President Clinton signed into law the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, which included the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993 (Reve92,263. The Act added
nue Act of 1993). 1993-33 United States Tax Rep. (RIA)
Internal Revenue Code § 197, entitled "Amortization of Goodwill and Certain Other
Intangibles." Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 tit. XIII, ch. 1, § 13261
(1993), reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 213, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 230-39 (1993) (adding
I.R.C. § 197). Section 197 provides in part:
(a) GENERAL RULE.-A taxpayer shall be entitled to an amortization deduction with respect to any amortizable section 197 intangible.
The amount of such deduction shall be determined by amortizing the
adjusted basis (for purposes of determining gain) of such intangible ratably over the 15-year period beginning with the month in which such
intangible was acquired.
(b) No OTHER DEPRECIATION OR AMORTIZATION DEDUCTION ALLowABLE.-Except as provided in subsection (a), no depreciation or
amortization deduction shall be allowable with respect to any amortizable section 197 intangible.
(c) AMORTIZABLE SECTION 197 INTANGILE.-For purposes of this

section(1) IN GENERAL.-Except as otherwise provided in this section,
the term 'amortizable section 197 intangible' means any section 197 intangible-
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is acquired by the taxpayer after the date of enand
is held in connection with the conduct of a
activity described in section 212.

(d) SECrION 197 INTANGIBLE.-For purposes of this section(1) IN GENERAL.-Except as otherwise provided in this section,
the term 'section 197 intangible' means(A) goodwill,
(B) going concern value,
(C) any of the following intangible items:
(i) workforce in place including its composition and
terms and conditions (contractual or otherwise) of its employment,
(ii) business books and records, operating systems,
or any other information base (including lists or other information with
respect to current or prospective customers),
(iii) any patent, copyright, formula, process, design,
pattern, knowhow, format, or other similar item,
(iv) any customer-based intangible,
(v) any supplier-based intangible, and
(vi) any other similar item,
(D) any license, permit, or other right granted by a governmental unit or an agency or instrumentality thereof,
(E) any covenant not to compete (or other arrangement
to the extent such arrangement has substantially the same effect as a
covenant not to compete) entered into in connection with an acquisition (directly or indirectly) of an interest in a trade or business or substantial portion thereof, and
(F) any franchise, trademark, or trade name.
(2) CUSTOMER-BASED INTANGIBLE.(A) IN GENERAL.-The term 'customer-based intangible'

means(i) composition of market,
(ii) market share, and
(iii) any other value resulting from future provision
of goods or services pursuant to relationships (contractual or otherwise)
in the ordinary course of business with customers.
(B) SPECIAL RULE FOR FINANCIAL INSTITrrIONS.-In the
case of a financial institution, the term 'customer-based intangible' includes deposit base and similar items.
I.R.C. § 197(a)-(d) (1993), reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 213, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 230-31
(1993). The statute does not provide for deduction or depreciation of the following
items: financial interests; land; computer software; certain film, sound recording or
book rights, patents, copyrights and contract rights; leasehold interests; sports
franchises; mortgage servicing rights; and certain transaction costs. I.RC. § 197(e).
Generally, these items are either addressed elsewhere within the Code or regulations,
or will remain nondepreciable. H.R. REP. No. 213, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 217-25
(1993). Congress has also authorized the Treasury Department to promulgate regulations to exclude "certain rights of fixed duration" from the definition of a § 197 intangible. Id. at 213. The new law is effective as of the date of enactment, but provides
taxpayers with an election to apply the new law to property acquired after July 25,
1991. I.R.C. § 197 (g)(2) (1993), reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 213, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
238 (1993). Taxpayers may also elect not to apply the new law to transactions which
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under certain circumstances since 1918,6 the Internal Revenue Serwere under binding contract as of the date of enactment. § 19 7 (g) (3) (A) (i), reprinted
in H.R. REP. No. 213, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 238 (1993).
Citing the "severe backlog" of disputes between taxpayers and the IRS, Congress
specifically enacted § 197 to simplify the law in the area of intangible assets. H.R. REP.
No. 213, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 690 (1993). In an effort to encourage the IRS to expedite the resolution of this backlog, the Conference Committee Managers (Managers)
stressed that any cases litigated in the future would be stripped of most of their precedential value due to the new law. Id. The Service was also asked to consider the
principles of the new law in resolving existing cases, although the Managers stressed
that the new law should not be treated as Congress's interpretation of the prior law.
See id. (noting that "no inference is intended that any deduction should be allowed in
these cases for assets that are not amortizable under [prior] law"). Finally, the Managers required the Treasury Department to submit an annual report to Congress on the
volume and progress of pending disputes in audit and litigation on the issue of the
amortization of intangibles. Id. Moreover, this report was to include an analysis of
the effects of the new law on the resolution of outstanding disputes. Id.
5 See MorningLedger, 113 S. Ct. at 1674-79 (summarizing the various points of controversy since the inclusion of a regulatory provision for the amortization of intangible assets in the Internal Revenue Code of 1919).
6 The Revenue Act of 1918 provided taxpayers with a deduction for depreciation
as follows: "[I]n computing the net income of a corporation subject to the tax ...
there shall be allowed as [a] deduction [ ] ... [a] reasonable allowance for the exhaustion, wear and tear of property used in the trade or business, including a reasonable
allowance for obsolescence." Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 234(a) (7), 40 Stat. 1057,
1077-78 (1919) (current version at I.R.C. § 167(a) (1988)). Since this legislation,
Congress has re-enacted this portion of the tax code with nearly identical language no
less than eight times. See Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, § 23(k), 47 Stat. 169, 181
(1932); Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 23(1), 48 Stat. 680, 689 (1934); Revenue Act
of 1936, ch. 690, § 23(1), 49 Stat. 1648, 1660 (1936); Revenue Act of 1938, ch. 289,
§ 23(1), 52 Stat. 447, 462 (1938); Internal Revenue Code of 1939, § 23(1), 53 Stat. 1,
14 (1939); Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 167(a), 68A Stat. 3, 351 (1954); Internal
Revenue Code of 1986, § 167(a) (1988). The IRS issued regulations under the 1918
statute specifically providing for depreciation of intangible property. T.D. 2929, C.B.
133 (1919). The regulations permitted a deduction for depreciation of an intangible
if "[the asset] acquired through capital outlay [was] known from experience to be of
value in the business for only a limited period, the length of which [could] be estimated from experience with reasonable certainty." Id. These regulations were
amended in 1919 to remove the following: "There can be no such allowance in respect of good will, trade names, trade-marks, trade brands, secret formulae, or
processes." Id.
During the period that began with the enactment of the Revenue Act of 1918
and ended with the decision of the Eighth Circuit in Red Wing Malting Co. v. Willcuts,
the IRS allowed deductions for depreciation or obsolescence of goodwill under certain circumstances. See T.B.R1 44, 1 C.B. 133, 137 (1919) ("It is, therefore, the opinion of the Advisory Tax Board (1) that distillers and dealers in liquors are entitled to
make a deduction ... on account of depreciation or obsolescence of their intangibles,
such as good will, trade-marks, trade brands, etc., such deduction being limited to
assignable assets, the value of which has been destroyed by prohibition legislation
.... "); Red Wing Malting, 15 F.2d at 627, 634 (affirming the district court's disallowance of a barley manufacturer's deduction for the loss of goodwill resulting from the
enactment of prohibition) (8th Cir. 1926), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 763 (1927). See infra
notes 58-63 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of Red Wing Malting. Following Red Wing Malting, the Service amended the regulations to deny explicitly de-
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vice (IRS or Service) has rarely found such circumstances to exist. 7
The IRS has typically disallowed these deductions, arguing that the
intangible asset the taxpayer is attempting to depreciate is inseparable from goodwill.' Goodwill has long been held by the IRS and
preciation of goodwill. T.D. 4055, 6-2 C.B. 63 (1927). Since the amendment, the
regulations and the position of the IRS have remained the same. Morning Ledger, 113
S. Ct. at 1675 n.8.
7 See TAX POLICY: ISSUES AND POLICY PROPOSALS REGARDING TAX TREATMENT OF
INTANGIBLE ASSETS, Report to the joint Committee on Taxation, Executive Summary 4
(United States General Accounting Office 1991) [hereinafter GAO Report] (reporting
that the IRS disallows amortization of intangible assets in 70% of all cases). The General Accounting Office (GAO) reported that these disallowances resulted in proposed
adjustments to taxable income of approximately $8 billion for the open tax years
between 1979 and 1987. Id. at 3-4. The GAO's study revealed customer-based intangibles as the type of intangible asset taxpayers had most often attempted to depreciate. Id. at 4, 22. (For a definition of customer-based intangibles see infra note 10
and accompanying text.) This category accounted for $10.5 billion in asset value and
resulted in $4.1 billion of proposed adjustments. GAO Report, supra, at 4.
The GAO study, ordered by the Joint Committee on Taxation, recommended
legislative change to the tax law to dispose of the conflict between taxpayers and the
IRS and to bring about consistency between the treatment of tangible and intangible
assets. Id. at 5; Letter from Jennie S. Stathis, Director, Tax Policy and Administration
Issues, to The Honorable Dan Rostenkowski, Chairman, Joint Committee on Taxation, and The Honorable Lloyd Bentsen, Vice Chairman, Joint Committee on Taxation Congress of the United States (August 9, 1991), reprinted in GAO Report, supra.
Enacting the suggested legislation in August, 1993, Congress apparently followed the
advice of the GAO. See supra note 4 (detailing the provisions of the new law).
8 See GAO Report, supra note 7, at 4 (indicating that the IRS attempts to classify
intangible assets as goodwill in 70% of the cases in which taxpayers have claimed such
a deduction).
Goodwill has been defined in many ways. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 625 (5th
ed. 1979). For example, under one definition, goodwill is:
The favor which the management of a business wins from the public.... The fixed and favorable consideration of customers arising from
The favorable consideraestablished and well-conducted business ....
tion shown by the purchasing public to goods known to emanate from a
particular source.... Good will is an intangible asset.... It means every
advantage, every positive advantage, that has been acquired by a proprietor in carrying on his business, whether connected with the premises
in which the business is conducted, or with the name under which it is
managed, or with any other matter carrying with it the benefit of the
business....
Id. (citations omitted). A second definition consists of: "The excess of cost of an acquired firm or operating unit over the current or fair market value of net assets of the
acquired unit." Id. Finally, goodwill is described as: "The ability of a business to
generate income in excess of a normal rate [of return] on assets due to superior managerial skills, market position, new product technology, etc." Id.
The second definition is known as the "residual definition." See Newark Morning
Ledger Co. v. United States, 945 F.2d 555, 560 (3d Cir. 1991) (arguing that the
proper definition of goodwill for tax purposes was "the residual value that remains
after all assets with determinable useful lives and ascertainable values have been accounted for"), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 1670 (1993). This definition is distinguishable from
the "expectancy of continued patronage" definition described first above. See Com-
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accepted by taxpayers to be nondepreciable.
Much of the litigation concerning intangible assets has involved assets described as "customer-based intangibles."1 ° Where
taxpayers have attempted to value and depreciate customer-based
intangible assets, the IRS has consistently determined them to be
indistinguishable from goodwill and therefore nondepreciable."
Neither the Internal Revenue Code nor the regulations, however,
12
have historically provided a cognizable definition of "goodwill."
Until the recent passage of the Revenue Reconciliation Act of
1993,13 Congress and the Treasury had elected instead to saddle
the courts with the burden of providing the definition. 4 Although
missioner v. Killian, 314 F.2d 852, 855 (5th Cir. 1963) (defining goodwill as "the reasonable expectation that 'the old customers will resort to the old place'") (quotation
omitted); Boe v. Commissioner, 307 F.2d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1962) (construing goodwill as "the expectancy of continued patronage, for whatever reason").
9 See Morning Ledger, 113 S. Ct. at 1675 (observing that the nondepreciability of
goodwill is "so well settled that the only question litigated in recent years regarding
this area of the law is whether a particular asset is 'goodwill'") (quoting Houston
Chronicle Publishing Co. v. United States, 481 F.2d 1240, 1247 (5th Cir. 1973)). See
also supra note 6 and accompanying text (discussing the long-unchanged language of
the Internal Revenue Code and Treasury Regulations prohibiting depreciation of
goodwill); GAO Report, supra note 7, at 18 (discussing generally the evolution of the
rules regarding the amortization of intangible assets).
10 Morning Ledger, 113 S.Ct. at 1676. Customer-based intangibles can be defined
as "the composition of market, market share, and any other value resulting from the
future provision of goods or services pursuant to relationships with customers (contractual or otherwise) in the ordinary course of business." H.R. REP. No. 111, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. 763 (1993). Many taxpayers have battled the IRS in litigation concerning the depreciability of customer-based intangibles. See, e.g. Donrey, Inc. v.
United States, 809 F.2d 534, 535 (8th Cir. 1987) (litigating depreciation of newspaper
subscription list); Houston Chronicle Publishing Co. v. United States, 481 F.2d 1240,
1242 (5th Cir. 1973) (same), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1129 (1974); Boe v. Commissioner,
307 F.2d 339, 340-42 (9th Cir. 1962) (deciding the depreciability of purchased medical service contracts); Richard S. Miller & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 537 F.2d 446,
449 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (addressing depreciability of insurance expirations); Colorado
Nat'l Bankshares, Inc. v. Commissioner, 60 T.C.M.(CCH) 771, 772-73, 774 (1990) (litigating the deductibility of depreciation of bank core deposit base intangible), affd,
984 F.2d 383 (10th Cir. 1993); Citizens & Southern Corp. v. Commissioner, 91 T.C.
463, 464 (1988) (same), affdpercuriam, 919 F.2d 1492 (11th Cir. 1990); Computing &
Software, Inc. v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 223, 224 (1975) (analyzing the depreciability
of customer credit reporting files); see also GAO Report, supra note 7, at 4, 20-21, 22
(discussing the magnitude of the conflict between the IRS and taxpayers in the area
of customer-based intangibles).
I1 GAO Report, supra note 7, at 20.
12 MorningLedger, 945 F.2d at 559 n.5.
13 See supra note 4 for a description of the new provisions pertaining to amortization of intangibles contained in the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993.
14 Morning Ledger, 945 F.2d at 559 n.5. The court observed:
Despite the recurrence of the issue, neither Congress, the Treasury, nor
the Service has seen fit to promulgate a uniform or coherent definition
of the term. Rather, the Service apparently has been content to permit
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courts addressing the issue have generally adopted the same or
very similar definitions of "goodwill," 15 those courts have nonetheless applied the definition differently in analyzing similar fact patterns. 16 This lack of judicial consistency has resulted in extreme
uncertainty for taxpayers in attempting to evaluate the income tax
7
consequences of potential business acquisitions.1
In the recent case Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States,'"
the United States Supreme Court provided additional guidance in
this complex and controversial area. 9 The Morning Ledger Court
deemphasized the definition of goodwill, and instead adopted a
20
two-pronged test for the depreciability of intangible assets.
the courts to wrestle, case-by-case, with the contours of this elusive concept, with the result that it wins most cases because the taxpayer cannot
sustain the onerous burden of establishing value and determinable life.
Id. Prospectively, § 197 of the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993 will reduce the
probability of conflict, as it allows for the depreciation of goodwill and most other
purchased intangible assets. See Mark B. Persellin, Depreciation of Customer-Based Intangibles Confirmed by Supreme Court in Newark Morning Ledger, 45 TAX EXEcuTr E 211,
215 (1993) (predicting that legislation prescribing a uniform depreciable life for intangibles would provide increased certainty and uniformity and decreased compliance costs). See also supranote 4 (discussing in detail the provisions of the new § 197).
15 See, e.g., Des Moines Gas Co. v. Des Moines, 238 U.S. 153, 164-65 (1915) (defining goodwill as "that element of value which inheres in the fixed and favorable consideration of customers, arising from an established and well-known and well-conducted
business"); Computing & Software, Inc., 64 T.C. at 232 (defining goodwill as "the expectancy that 'the old customers will resort to the old place'") (citation omitted); Golden
State Towel & Linen Serv., Ltd. v. United States, 373 F.2d 938, 941 (Ct. Cl. 1967)
(defining goodwill as "the expectancy of continued patronage") (quoting Boe, 307
F.2d at 343).
16 Compare, e.g., General Television, Inc. v. United States, 449 F. Supp. 609, 610,
613 (D. Minn. 1978) (ruling that a taxpayer could not amortize subscription contracts
because the purchase of such contracts was essentially the purchase of the expectancy
that customers would continue to patronize the business), afld per curiam, 598 F.2d
1148 (8th Cir. 1979) with Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 734 F. Supp.
176, 184, 185 (D.N.J. 1990) (allowing depreciation of subscription lists because the
taxpayer had proven the asset to have value and life separate from goodwill), rev'd,
945 F.2d 555 (3d Cir. 1991), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 1670 (1993).
17 See Gregorcich, supra note 1, at 251, 254-71 (noting the inconsistencies in the
treatment of intangible assets and discussing the need for comprehensive legislation
concerning the depreciation of intangible assets).
18 113 S.Ct. 1670 (1993).
19 See Persellin, supra note 14, at 211 (categorizing the decision in Morning Ledger
as a "clear taxpayer victory," and assessing the impact that the decision would have on
current disputes between taxpayers and the IRS).
20 Morning Ledger, 113 S. Ct. at 1681. The Government conceded that the reason
for the historical prohibition on the depreciation of goodwill was that goodwill, by
definition, did not have a determinable useful life. Id. at 1680 (citing Brief for Respondent at 13, Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1670 (1993)
(No. 91-1135)). In response to this concession, the Court noted that "[t]he entire
justification for refusing to permit the depreciation of goodwill evaporates... when
the taxpayer demonstrates that the asset in question wastes over an ascertainable pe-
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Under MorningLedger, a taxpayer who can prove that an intangible
asset has an ascertainable value and limited useful life will be entifled to depreciation regardless of the asset's relationship to or resemblance of goodwill.2 1
Newark Morning Ledger Co. (Morning Ledger) merged with
The Herald Company (Herald) in 1987 (Herald merger).22 In
1976, Herald had acquired substantially all of the outstanding
stock of Booth Newspapers, Inc. (Booth) 23 and eventually merged
with Booth in 1977 (Booth merger) .24 The then prevailing tax law
required Herald to allocate its basis25 in the Booth shares among
the assets acquired in the Booth merger, based upon the relative
fair market values 26 of the assets at the date of the merger.2 7 Conriod of time." Id. To satisfy the two-pronged test, a taxpayer must prove: 1) that the
asset is capable of being valued; and 2) that the asset has an ascertainable useful life.
Id. at 1681.
21 Id. The Court essentially adopted the test advocated by the Fifth Circuit in
Houston Chronicle. Id. at 1677, 1681 (citing Houston Chronicle Publishing Co. v.
United States, 481 F.2d 1240, 1250 (5th Cir. 1973)). The Court's decision, however,
effectively eliminated the third prong of the Houston Chronicle test, which required
the taxpayer to additionally prove that the asset was "separate and distinct" from
goodwill. See id. at 1681; Houston Chronicle, 481 F.2d at 1250. For a more detailed
discussion of Houston Chronicle see infra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
22 MorningLedger, 113 S. Ct. at 1672. Prior to and after the merger, both Morning
Ledger and Herald were in the business of publishing newspapers. Id.
23 Booth Newspapers, Inc. was a corporation which published eight Michigan
Newspapers. Id. The eight newspapers were The Ann Arbor News, The Bay City Times,
The Hint Journal, The Grand Rapids Press, The Jackson Citizen Patriot,Kalamazoo Gazette,
The Muskegon Chronicle, and The Saginaw News. Id. at 1672 n.2. In addition, Booth
owned 100% of the stock of a subsidiary corporation that published ParadeMagazine.
Id. at 1672.
24 Id.
25 Basis is defined as "the value assigned to an asset for the purpose of determining
gain (or loss) on the sale or transfer [of the asset]." BLACK'S LAw DICTIoNARY 151-52
(6th ed. 1990). For federal income tax purposes, the basis of property is its cost.
I.R.C. § 1012 (1988). The basis for the calculation of depreciation with respect to
property is its federal income tax "adjusted basis." I.RC. § 16 7 (g) (1988). The adjusted basis of property is its basis, adjusted for certain capital expenditures required
to be charged to the property, and reduced by depreciation and amortization already
taken against the asset. I.R.C. §§ 1011, 1016 (1988).
26 Fair market value is "[t]he amount at which property would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy
or sell and both having reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 597 (6th ed. 1990); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1 (c) (2) (defining "fair
market value" similarly); In re Estate of Williams v. Commissioner, 256 F.2d 217, 218
(9th Cir. 1958) (same).
27 MorningLedger, 113 S. Ct. at 1672 (citing I.R.C. §§ 332, 334(b) (2) (1976)). Sections 332 and 334(b) (2) provided that a parent company would not be required to
recognize taxable gain upon the liquidation of a subsidiary, but instead required the
substitution of the parent's basis from the stock of the subsidiary and the spread of
that basis among the subsidiary's assets. §§ 332, 334(b) (2). Current tax law, however,
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sistent with these principles, Herald allocated $234 million of its
$328 million basis to financial and tangible assets. 28 Of the remaining $94 million, Herald allocated $67.8 million to an intangible
asset, "paid subscribers,"2 9 and $26.2 million to goodwill and going
concern value. 0
On its 1977-1980 federal income tax returns, Herald deducted
31
certain amounts for depreciation of the paid subscribers asset.
Herald computed the depreciation deductions based upon the estimated length of time subscribers to each newspaper would continue their relationships with the paper.3 2 Upon audit, the IRS
disallowed the deductions, asserting that the paid subscribers intangible was indistinguishable from goodwill, and assessed additional taxes.3 3 Herald paid the additional taxes and resulting
interest.3 4 After the Herald merger, Morning Ledger filed a timely
claim for refund.3 5 The IRS took no action in response to Morning
Ledger's refund claim, and Morning Ledger filed suit in the
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey to rerequires the parent to carry over the subsidiaries' basis in each asset and essentially
ignores the parent's basis in the stock of the liquidating subsidiary. See I.R.C.
§ 334(b)(1) (1988); see also BoRIs I. BrrTIER & JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION Or CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 1 11.40 (5th ed. 1987) (discussing
the parent's succession to the subsidiary's basis in its assets and commenting on the
loss of the parent company's basis in the stock of the subsidiary).
28 Morning Ledger, 113 S. Ct. at 1672. These assets included cash, securities, receivables, buildings and equipment, inventory, and the stock of Parade. Id.
29 Morning Ledger defined "paid subscribers" as the value associated with "the fact
that the customers in question paid for their newspapers, rather than receiving them
for free, and that they subscribed to the newspaper, requesting regular delivery,
rather than purchasing it on a single copy basis." Id. at 1672 n.4 (quoting Brief for

Petitioner at 4 n.5, Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1670
(1993) (No. 91-1135)). The $67.8 million value was based upon the estimated future
income to be derived from the 460,000 existing paid subscribers as of the merger
date. Id. at 1672-73.
30 Id. at 1673. Going concern value is "[t]he value which inheres in a company
where its business is established, as distinguished from one which has yet to establish
its business." BLACK'S LAw DIcrIONARY 691 (6th ed. 1990) (citation omitted).
31 Morning Ledger, 113 S. Ct. at 1673.
32 Id. Herald employed the services of statistical experts to assist in determining
the lives it used to compute depreciation. Id. These experts determined their estimates using actuarial factors for death, relocation, competition and changing tastes.
Id. The lives assigned by Herald ranged from 14.7 years for subscribers of The Ann
Arbor News to 23.4 years for subscribers of The Bay City Times Sunday edition. Id. The
Government stipulated to the accuracy of these estimates, choosing instead to focus
its argument on other issues. Id.
33 Id.
34 Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 945 F.2d 555, 557 (3d Cir. 1991),

rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 1670 (1993).
35 Id. at 557. Morning Ledger filed the claim as the successor to Herald after the
Herald merger. Id.
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cover the refund. 6
The district court ruled in favor of Morning Ledger.3 7 The
court found that the standard set forth by the Treasury Regulations
for the depreciability of intangible assets 38 was to be applied via a
36 Id. Pursuant to the Internal Revenue Code, taxpayers may not initiate suit to
recover taxes, interest, and/or penalties until six months from the date of the filing of
a refund claim, unless the IRS renders a decision on the claim within that period.
I.R.C. § 6532(a)(1) (1988). Morning Ledger filed suit in the district court after waiting the statutory six months. Morning Ledger, 113 S. Ct. at 1673.
Taxpayers seeking to litigate against the IRS have three choices regarding forum.
Richard A. Levine et. al, Tax Court Litigation, TAx MGMT. (BNA) 630-4th, at A-4
(1992). First, the taxpayer may pay a deficiency assessed by the IRS and sue for a
refund in the United States District Court, which has concurrent original jurisdiction
over any civil action for the recovery of taxes alleged to have been collected erroneously. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1988). Second, the United States Court of Claims also has
concurrent jurisdiction over such matters. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1988) (providing the
Court of Claims with jurisdiction over any action against the United States arising out
of the Constitution, act of Congress, or an executive department regulation). Third,
the taxpayer may sue the United States in the Tax Court after receiving a notice of
deficiency from the IRS. I.R.C. §§ 6213(a), 7442 (1988). Thus, the taxpayer need not
pay a deficiency prior to initiating a Tax Court action. 15 UNITED STATES TAx REPORTER
74,009 (1993). A taxpayer may pay the additional tax after receiving a notice of deficiency without depriving the Tax Court ofjurisdiction. I.R.C. § 6213(b) (4)
(1988). Among other reasons, a taxpayer may pay the tax to stop the accrual of interest and penalties on the deficiency should the case ultimately be lost. Levine, supra,at
A-4 n.47.
In addition to the requirement (or lack thereof) to pay a tax deficiency prior to
instituting an action against the IRS, there are several other considerations affecting
taxpayers' choice of forum. Id. at A-3 to A-6. One important additional factor is the
impact of precedent from various other courts upon the courts in which the taxpayer
is considering filing suit. Id. at A-4. For example, a district court, as well as the Tax
Court, is bound by a prior ruling of the numbered circuit court of appeals to which
the case at bar would be appealable. Id. at A-5. The U.S. Claims Court, however, is
bound only by the decisions of the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals. Id.
Other factors to be considered by taxpayers in choosing a forum for tax cases
include the availability ofjury trials, different discovery rules in the various courts, the
backlog of cases in each court, venue, government representation, and the risk of an
increased tax deficiency. Id. at A-3, A-4 to A-6. For example, jury trials are available
only in district court proceedings. Id. at A-6. Similarly, Tax Court discovery rules are
generally less extensive and stress a preference that the objectives of discovery be
achieved through informal consultation among the parties. Id. at A-5 (citing TAx
COURT R. 70). Court backlogs vary, but the Tax Court and Claims Court sometimes
take one to two years after the completion of briefing and/or trial to issue a decision.
Id. at A-6. In Tax Court litigation, the District Counsel, employees of the Office of
Chief Counsel within the IRS, represent the government. Id. at A-4. In district court
and Claims Court refund suits, the Tax Division of the Justice Department usually
defends the IRS. Id. Moreover, in refund suits, the IRS can assert additional taxes
only as a setoff against the overpayment claimed by the taxpayer. Id. In Tax Court
litigation, however, the court is not limited by the amount of deficiency stated in the
IRS's notice of deficiency, and may assess any amount of additional taxes. Id.
37 Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 734 F. Supp. 176, 185 (D.N.J.
1990), rev'd, 945 F.2d 555 (3d Cir. 1991), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 1670 (1993).
38 Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (amended 1960). The regulation provides:
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judicially developed two-pronged test. 9 This test, the court explained, required the taxpayer to prove that: 1) the intangible asset
sought to be depreciated had a limited useful life which was capable of reasonable estimation; and 2) the asset had a value which
could be ascertained and was separate and distinct from goodwill.4"
Applying this test, the district court found that Morning
Ledger had proven that the paid subscriber base of the Booth
newspapers had a limited useful life which could be estimated with
reasonable accuracy.4" The court also agreed with the valuation
approach utilized by Herald 4 2 and rejected an alternative valuation
methodology proposed by the Government.4" The court thus concluded that Herald had properly claimed depreciation deductions
for the paid subscribers, using the correct adjusted tax basis and
If an intangible asset is known from experience or other factors to be of
use in the business or in the production of income for only a limited
period, the length of which can be estimated with reasonable accuracy,
such an intangible asset may be the subject of a depreciation allowance.
Examples are patents and copyrights. An intangible asset, the useful life
of which is not limited, is not subject to the allowance for depreciation.
No allowance will be permitted merely because, in the unsupported
opinion of the taxpayer, the intangible asset has a limited useful life.
No deduction is allowable with respect to good will.
Id.
Morning Ledger, 734 F. Supp. at 184.
Id. (citing Donrey, Inc. v. United States, 809 F.2d 534, 537 (8th Cir. 1987);
Houston Chronicle Publishing Co. v. United States, 481 F.2d 1240, 1250 (5th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1129 (1974); Citizens & Southern Corp. v. Commissioner,
91 T.C. 463, 479 (1988), afTd, 919 F.2d 1492 (11th Cir. 1990); Rev. Rul. 74-456, 1974-2
C.B. 65, 66).
41 Id. at 181. Before trial, the parties stipulated that, provided the court determined the paid subscribers to be a depreciable asset, the useful lives computed by
Morning Ledger's experts would be accepted by the Government as the proper depreciable lives. Id. at 180. Thus, Morning Ledger was not required to prove that its
estimates of the useful lives of the assets were correct, but only that such useful lives
could be reasonably estimated. Id. at 181.
42 Id. at 181-82. Herald used the "income approach" to value the paid subscribers
asset. Id. at 182. This method involves calculating the future revenue expected to be
derived from the paid subscribers, subtracting the cost of collecting that income, and
then computing the present value of that stream of revenue to be received over the
useful lives of the paid subscribers. Id.
43 Id. at 181-82. The Government argued that the cost approach, which involved
merely calculating the cost to generate an equivalent number of new subscriptions,
was the appropriate method of valuation in this case. Id. The court also rejected this
argument, noting that "[tihe cost of obtaining subscribers does not equate with their
value to the enterprise" because the life characteristics and corresponding value of
the new subscribers would not be the same as those of existing subscribers. Id. at 182.
The market approach, a third alternative, would value the asset based upon its separate fair market value. Id. at 181. The court rejected the market approach in this case
because newspaper subscriber bases are rarely, if ever, sold apart from the newspaper
operation as a whole. Id.
39
40
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depreciable life."
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed. 45 Focusing on the definition of goodwill, the Third Circuit
rejected the residual definition advocated by the district court,46
and adopted instead what it considered the majority position 47 that
goodwill meant "the expectation of continued patronage" 4 or "the

expectancy that old customers will resort to the old place." 49 The

44 Id. at 183-84. The district court further directed the parties to calculate the
proper refund of taxes and interest due to Morning Ledger as the result of the decision. Id. at 185.
45 Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 945 F.2d 555, 568-69 (3d Cir.
1991), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 1670, 1683 (1993).
46 See id. at 568 ("We conclude, in short, that the district court applied the wrong
definition of 'goodwill.'"). The residual definition urged by Morning Ledger defines
goodwill as "the residual value that remains after all assets with determinable useful
lives and ascertainable values have been accounted for." Id. at 560. The district court
had stated that "[g]oodwill, by definition, has an indefinite life and is valued using the
residual method," without citing any authority for this proclamation. Morning Ledger,
734 F. Supp. at 182. The Supreme Court ultimately agreed with the district court,
however, and ruled that an asset's relationship to the expectancy of continued patronage was irrelevant in assessing depreciability. Newark Morning Ledger Co. v.
United States, 113 S. Ct. 1670, 1676 n.9 (1993). Specifically, the Court stated:
"[W] hile the 'expectancy of continued patronage' is a serviceable description of what
we generally mean when we describe an intangible asset that has no useful life and no
ascertainable value, this shibboleth tells us nothing about whether the asset in question is depreciable." Id. See infra notes 128-33 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Supreme Court's acceptance of the district court's definition of goodwill.
47 The court of appeals noted that the authority on which Morning Ledger relied
was no more than a "minority strand amid the phalanx of cases that have considered
the definition and application of the term 'goodwill' in the context of § 1.167(a)-3,
and which support the Service's position." See MorningLedger, 945 F.2d at 565-66 (citing 16 decisions of various courts, each defining goodwill as the expectation of continued patronage or the tendency for the customer to return to a business which (s) he
has dealt with in the past) (citations omitted).
48 Id. (quoting Boe v. Commissioner, 307 F.2d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1962)). In Boe,
the taxpayers, a husband and wife, sought to deduct the value they had assigned to
certain terminated medical service contracts acquired in connection with the
purchase of a medical practice. Boe, 307 F.2d at 340, 341-42. The Ninth Circuit rejected the taxpayer's characterization that no goodwill could attach to the sale of a
medical practice due to the nature of a medical practice and the dependency of continued patronage upon the personal skill of a physician. Id. at 342-43. In rejecting
the taxpayer's position, the court of appeals noted that the contract for the sale of the
practice acknowledged that "[g]oodwill [was] an important and the principal part of
the assets being sold." Id. at 343. Therefore, the appellate court ruled that the medical service contracts must have assured the purchasers of continued patronage at least
to the extent that they paid a significant amount for the practice. Id. at 342-43.
Thus, having defined goodwill as "the sum total of those imponderable qualities
which attract the custom of a business" and "the expectancy of continued patronage,
for whatever reason," the court ruled that the terminable at-will medical service contracts purchased by the taxpayers represented goodwill because their value depended
upon expected continued patronage. Id. at 343 (citation omitted).
49 Morning Ledger, 945 F.2d at 565 (citations omitted).
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court accepted this definition and concluded that some intangible
assets must be classified as nondepreciable goodwill notwithstanding the fact that those assets have ascertainable limited useful lives
and reasonably estimable values. 50 Because Morning Ledger had
not shown that the paid subscribers asset was separate and distinct
from goodwill, the court continued, the asset was
nondepreciable. 5 '
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari5 2 to resolve a conflict between the circuit courts of appeals and to attempt
to settle an area of great controversy between taxpayers and the
IRS.5 3 Similar to the district court, the Supreme Court applied a
two-pronged test for determining the depreciability of intangible
assets.5 4 The Court confirmed that a taxpayer seeking to depreciate a customer-based intangible asset must show that the asset has
both an ascertainable value and a limited useful life that can be
reasonably estimated.5 5 The Court, however, impliedly rejected
part of the Third Circuit's test by declining to require the taxpayer
50 Id. at 568.
51 Id. The court

inferred that customer lists, to which it likened Morning Ledger's
paid subscribers asset, were generally not depreciable if acquired as part of an entire
continuing business. Id. This perceived prohibition, the court reasoned, was an inherent difficulty in separating the value of the list from the value of the goodwill of
the business. Id. The separability requirement has been strongly criticized by some
commentators. See Meehan, supra note 3, at 577, 578 (criticizing the separateness
requirement);JohnJ. Cross, III, PurchasePriceAllocations and Amortization of Intangibles,
TAX MGm-r. (BNA) 209-4th, at A-20 (1991) (same). Meehan criticized the Tax Court's
decisions in Citizens & Southern Corp. v. Commissionerand ColoradoNat' Bankshares,Inc.
v. Commissioner, which required proving the asset to be separate and distinct from
goodwill to be depreciable. Meehan, supra note 3, at 578. Instead, Meehan argued,
proof of ascertainable value and useful life, as well as a reasonable schedule for amortization of the asset, would suffice, provided that the taxpayer had used a reasonable
amortization schedule. Id. This test, Meehan continued, combined with a strict adherence to the residual method of purchase price allocation, would ensure the
proper valuation and depreciation of intangible assets. Id. at 578, 593.
Another commentator observed that the separateness requirement could be
"theoretically flawed." Cross, supra, at A-20. This flaw exists, the commentator contended, because the reasoning for the nondepreciability of goodwill is based upon the
fact that goodwill, by definition, has an indefinite useful life. Id. Therefore, a taxpayer able to establish that the asset it seeks to depreciate has a determinable useful
life has necessarily proven that the asset is not goodwill. Id.
52 Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1583 (1992).
53 Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1670, 1674 (1993). The
Court identified the conflict between the Eighth Circuit in Donrey, Inc. v. United States,
and the Eleventh Circuit in Citizens & Southern Corp. v. Commissioner. Id. at 1674 n.5
(citing Donrey, Inc. v. United States, 809 F.2d 534 (8th Cir. 1987); Citizens & Southern Corp. v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 463 (1988), aft4 919 F.2d 1492 (11th Cir. 1990)).
54 Id. at 1681; Morning Ledger, 734 F. Supp. at 184.
55 Morning Ledger, 113 S. CL at 1681.
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to establish the asset as separate and distinct from goodwill.5" Instead, the Court ruled that a taxpayer meeting the above test may
depreciate an intangible asset regardless of how the asset conformed to the accepted definition of goodwill. 7
One of the earliest decisions addressing the definition of
"goodwill" and the depreciation of related intangible assets was
Red Wing Malting Co. v. Wilcuts.58 In Red Wing Malting, the Eighth

Circuit affirmed a district court decision that denied a barley malt
manufacturer5 9 a deduction for the loss of goodwill resulting from
the enactment of the Eighteenth Amendment.6'
The court of appeals analyzed the then-current tax depreciation law under a predecessor to current Internal Revenue Code
Section 167.61 The court concluded that no goodwill deduction
could be allowed because goodwill was not susceptible to exhaustion, but instead had an indefinite existence.6 2 Following Red Wing
56

See id.; Persellin, supra note 14, at 214.

57 Morning Ledger, 113 S. Ct. at 1681.

15 F.2d 626 (8th Cir. 1926), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 763 (1927).
Red Wing Malting Company manufactured barley malt for a market that consisted exclusively of brewers of intoxicating beverages. Id. at 627.
60 Id. at 627, 634. The Eighteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
prohibited the manufacture, sale, or transportation of alcoholic beverages. U.S.
CONST. amend. XVIII (repealed 1933). As a result of the prohibition amendment
enacted in 1919, all of Red Wing Malting's customers ceased operations, and the market dried up completely. Red Wing Malting, 15 F.2d at 627. The court of appeals
pointed out, however, that Red Wing Malting could still legally produce barley malt.
Id.
For the taxable fiscal year ending August 31, 1918, the Tax Commissioner determined Red Wing Malting's taxable income to be $120,536.42 and assessed an income
tax liability of $29,893.44. Id. Red Wing Malting paid the tax and sued for a refund of
the entire amount, arguing that a deduction of $153,618.75 should have been allowed
against its taxable income for the loss of goodwill that had grown prior to the enactment of the Eighteenth Amendment. Id. Had this deduction been allowed, Red
Wing Malting asserted, it would have had no tax liability. Id.
61 Red Wing Malting, 15 F.2d at 628-34. The statute read, in pertinent part: "[I]n
computing the net income of a corporation subject to the tax imposed ... there shall
be allowed as [a deduction] ... [a] reasonable allowance for the exhaustion, wear and
tear of property used in the trade or business, including a reasonable allowance for
obsolescence." Revenue Act of 1918, § 234(a) (7), ch. 18, 40 Stat. 1057, 1077-78
(1919).
62 Red Wing Malting, 15 F.2d at 632-33. While acknowledging that goodwill was
"property," the court distinguished it from other types of intangible property, such as
patents or copyrights, which would have been depreciable or deductible under the
pertinent treasury regulations. Id. at 632; see, e.g., T.D. 2929, C.B. 133 (1919) (providing for a depreciation of intangible property, but only where the asset was "known
from experience to be of value in the business for only a limited period, the length of
which can be estimated from experience with reasonable certainty"). Although goodwill was derived from the conduct of business and was used in valuating a business, the
court observed that goodwill did not depreciate in the normal sense of the term. Red
58
59
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Malting, the IRS amended the regulations to specifically prohibit
the depreciation of goodwill. 63 Since that amendment, the IRS has
consistently maintained that goodwill is nondepreciable. 6 4
In light of the IRS's steadfast position, nearly all of the recent
litigation in the area of intangible assets has concerned whether or
not a given intangible should be classified as nondepreciable goodwill. 65 One of the earliest of these cases was Dodge Bros. v. United
States.6 6 In Dodge Bros., the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit ruled against a taxpayer that had claimed a deduction for depreciation of the design of a "proved car," 6 7 acquired in
the purchase of a going-concern business.6 8 The court of appeals
analyzed the nature of the asset, and concluded that the value was
Wing Malting, 15 F.2d at 632-33. Thus, the court of appeals concluded that no deduction was available even upon the loss of all the goodwill. Id. at 633-34.
The decision in Red Wing Maltingsignalledthe end of a period between 1919 and
1927 during which the IRS had allowed distillers and others in the liquor and brewing
industries affected by prohibition to depreciate goodwill. See, e.g., T.B.R. 44, 1 C.B.
133-34 (1919) (allowing brewers and distillers a deduction for the depreciation or
obsolescence of goodwill).
63 T.D. 4055, 6-2 C.B. 63 (1927). Purporting to follow Red Wing Malting, the announcement of the amendment of the regulations stated: "In view of the decision of
the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in Red Wing Malting Co. v. Willcuts,
Collector,dated November 5, 1926 ....
[the regulations] are hereby amended by the
addition thereto of the provision that: 'No deduction for depreciation, including obsolescence, is allowable in respect of good will.'" Id.
64 Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1670, 1675 n.8 (1993).
65 Gregorcich, supra note 1, at 258-59.
66 118 F.2d 95 (4th Cir. 1941).
67 "Proved car" was the name given to a four cylinder automobile designed and
first produced by John and Horace Dodge in 1914. Id. at 97. The design of the
proved car, known to the public as the "utility motor car," remained unchanged
through several years of production, despite the annual introduction of new models
by other auto manufacturers. Id. at 97-98.
68 Id. at 98, 102. Following the deaths of both John and Horace in 1920, the design for the car and all of the other assets of Dodge Brothers, Inc. were sold in 1925 to
a group of investors. Id. at 97. The acquiring corporation allocated approximately
$82 million of the $132 million net purchase price to tangible assets and the remaining $50 million to tangible assets. Id.
The IRS argued, and the district court agreed, that the entire $50 million was
goodwill. Id. at 99, 100. Dodge Brothers conceded that $40 million should be allocated to goodwill, but maintained that $10 million represented the model and design
of the proved car. Id. at 100. With the advent of the six-cylinder engine in the mid1920's, Dodge Brothers claimed the value of their four-cylinder design had depreciated, justifying a deduction. Id. at 98. The court acknowledged this argument as
"ingenious and plausible," but nonetheless concluded that "for the purposes for
which [Dodge Brothers] contends, the existence, apart from good will, of the 'proved
car' is almost as mythical as Santa Claus or Jack Frost, almost as illusory as general
prosperity." Id. at 102. Thus, the court ruled that the asset was inseparable from
nondepreciable goodwill, which it defined as "nothing more than the probability that
the old customers will resort to the old place." Id. at 101 (citation omitted).
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inherent not in the automobile itself, but in the design characteristics which made the car appealing to the public.6 9 Accordingly, the
court concluded that the proved car was simply a manifestation of
the goodwill built by the previous owner of the business.7 ° The
court consequently determined the asset to be indistinguishable
from goodwill and therefore nondepreciable under the prevailing
regulations.7 1
In addition to analyzing the distinguishability of assets from
goodwill, many courts addressing the depreciability of customerbased intangibles have applied a "mass-asset rule." 72 For example,
in Golden State Towel & Linen Service v. United States,73 the United
Id. (citation omitted).
Id. at 102.
71 Id. at 101, 102.
72 Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1670, 1676 (1993). The
mass-asset rule requires some intangible assets, such as customer or subscriber lists, to
be grouped as a single asset, even though the component parts of the asset may terminate separately over time. Id. The theory behind the rule is that such customer-based
assets may fluctuate in value and makeup over time. Id. Expiring components, however, will usually be replaced by new components, thus minimizing the fluctuations.
Id. The "mass-asset rule" is also known as the "indivisible asset rule." Id.
Courts adopting this rule have generally found intangibles to which the rule has
been applied to be indistinguishable from goodwill and therefore nondepreciable.
Golden State Towel & Linen Serv., Ltd. v. United States, 373 F.2d 938, 940-41 (Ct. Cl.
1967); see also Boe v. Commissioner, 307 F.2d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1962) (denying a
taxpayer a deduction for the termination of medical service contracts under the indivisible asset rule); Thrifticheck Serv. Corp. v. Commissioner, 287 F.2d 1, 2, 4-5 (2d
Cir. 1961) (applying a concept similar to the mass-asset rule to deny a deduction for
amortization of purchase price allocated to contracts to sell supplies and services to
customer banks); Anchor Cleaning Serv., Inc. v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 1029, 1032,
1033, 1035 (1954) (denying a deduction for losses resulting from the discontinuance
of purchased contracts forjanitorial services under an indivisible asset theory). But see
Metropolitan Laundry Co., Ltd. v. United States, 100 F. Supp. 803, 804-05, 807 (N.D.
Cal. 1951) (allowing a deduction for the loss of all of the taxpayer's customers in a
single market).
In Metropolitan Laundry, the taxpayer, Metropolitan Laundry, claimed a loss deduction because it was forced to abandon its laundry routes in an entire market. Id. at
804. The loss, the taxpayer alleged, arose when the United States seized Metropolitan
Laundry's plant for government use. Id. The taxpayer deducted the original cost of
the routes, which had been carried on its books as goodwill since being purchased in
1903, on its 1943 income tax return. Id. at 804, 806. The government disallowed the
deduction, classifying the loss as depreciation in the value of goodwill. Id. at 806.
The court agreed with the government that a loss in the value of goodwill was nondeductible in the absence of a cessation of business. Id. The district judge ruled, however, that an abandonment of business in an entire market was such a cessation,
notwithstanding that Metropolitan Laundry had continued business in other markets.
Id. at 804, 806-07. Accordingly, the court allowed the taxpayer's loss deduction. Id. at
807.
73 373 F.2d 938 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
69
70
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States Court of Claims disallowed loss deductions74 claimed with
respect to purchased customer lists. 75 Golden State had purchased
the businesses of two competitors and allocated portions of the
purchase prices to the customer lists of the acquired entities.7 6 On
its federal income tax returns, Golden State deducted an allocable
amount of the cost of the customer lists for each customer who had
ceased to do business with the company during the tax year.7 7 The
court disallowed these deductions, ruling that the customer lists
78
were indivisible assets that could not be separated from goodwill.
The cost of these mass-assets, the court ruled, would be deductible
only when all or a substantial and identifiable portion of the customers on the list had terminated.7 9
After Golden State and other similarly decided cases, 80 some
doubt remained as to whether assets related to the expectancy of
continued patronage would be deemed goodwill and therefore
nondepreciable as a matter of law under the mass-asset rule."1 The
decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
in Houston Chronicle Publishing Co. v. United States 2 answered this
question in the negative. 8 3 In Houston Chronicle, the court of ap74 Id. at 939, 944. The court distinguished between loss deductions and depreciation deductions. Id. at 941. Depreciation, the court explained, was by nature an estimated loss being spread over the useful life of the asset. Id. However, with loss
deductions, the court noted, an asset's life span was immaterial. Id. In cases involving
depreciation of customer-based intangibles, the court noted that the IRS usually prevailed due to the inability of the taxpayer to establish that the assets had useful lives
and/or values capable of reasonable estimation. Id. Conversely, the court observed
that loss deductions had been generally disallowed based on the mass-asset rule, especially when the customer relationships were terminable at will. Id. But cf Seaboard
Fin. Co. v. Commissioner, 23 T.C.M. (C.C.H.) 1512, 1516, 1535, 1536, 1537 (1964)
(allowing a deduction with respect to loan contracts which were not terminable at
will).
75 Golden State, 373 F.2d at 939.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id.

at 944.
Id. Distinguishing Metropolitan Laundry, the court refused to allow a deduction
where a taxpayer did not lose virtually all of its customers. Id. at 940-41. The test for
deduction, the court indicated, included a determination of whether the asset, or a
portion thereof, would have been transferable as a unit. Id.
80 See, e.g., Thrifticheck Serv. Corp. v. Commissioner, 287 F.2d 1, 2, 4-5 (2d Cir.
1961) (applying the indivisible asset rule to deny a deduction for the amortization of
the portion of the purchase price allocated to contracts to sell supplies and services to
customer banks); Anchor Cleaning Serv., Inc. v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 1029, 1032,
1033, 1035 (1954) (denying a deduction for losses resulting from the discontinuance
of purchased contracts for janitorial services under an indivisible asset rationale).
81 Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1670, 1676-77 (1993).
82 481 F.2d 1240 (5th Cir. 1973).
83 Morning Ledger, 113 S. Ct. at 1677 (citing Houston Chronicle, 481 F.2d at 1250).
79
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peals rejected the government's argument that purchased newspaper subscription lists were nondepreciable as a matter of law. 4
Instead, the court ruled that the depreciability of newspaper subscription lists was a purely factual issue that required satisfying a
two-pronged test."5 Under the test, the court articulated, taxpayers
seeking to depreciate a purchased newspaper subscription list
could do so if they demonstrated that the list had an ascertainable
value distinct and separate from goodwill and a limited useful life
that could be determined with reasonable accuracy.8 6
Since the taxpayer victory in Houston Chronicle, many taxpayers
have battled the IRS over factual questions concerning whether a
given intangible was depreciable.87 In one such case, Richard S.
Miller & Sons, Inc. v. United States,"8 the Court of Claims extended
the rule of Houston Chronicle to another customer-based intangible,
84 Houston Chronicle,481 F.2d at 1248. The court disarmed the government's position by surveying several cases in which taxpayers had been denied depreciation deductions for intangible assets. Id. at 1245-47 (citations omitted). The appellate panel
noted that the disposition of each case turned on a factual or evidentiary issue. Id. at
1247.
The court noted, however, that some assets such as goodwill were nondepreciable as a matter of law. Id. (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a) -3). The court considered the
nondepreciability of goodwill to be "so well settled that the only question litigated in
recent years regarding this area of law [had been] whether a particular asset [was]
'goodwill.'" Id. The court emphasized that a key characteristic of goodwill was that it
fluctuated in value but did not always predictably diminish. Id. at 1248. Thus, opined
the court, the key factual issue was whether the intangible asset in question possessed
characteristics similar to goodwill to be classified as goodwill. Id. Although newspaper subscription lists were intangible capital assets that could be depreciated if the
taxpayer sustained his burden, the court limited its holding to the depreciability of list
transactions. Id. at 1251, 1253-54.
The government also argued that the mass-asset rule should operate to deprive
the taxpayer of a depreciation deduction for the purchased subscription lists. Id. at
1249. Rejecting this argument, the court dismissed the mass-asset rule as merely another way of describing a taxpayer's inability to establish ascertainable values and useful lives for intangible assets which they sought to depreciate. Id. at 1249-50.
85 Id. at 1251, Satisfaction of this test, the court promulgated, placed a significant
burden on the taxpayer. Id. at 1250. Giving deference to the jury's finding for the
taxpayer, the court observed that the taxpayer "had manfully carried [the] heavy load"
that the burden of proof presented. Id. at 1254.
86 Id. at 1251. The IRS reacted to Houston Chronicleby issuing a ruling that modified prior rulings which held customer-based intangible assets to be nondepreciable
as a matter of law. Morning Ledger, 113 S. Ct. at 1677 (citing Rev. Rul. 74-456, 1974-2
C.B. 65). In the ruling, the IRS claimed that customer-based intangibles would generally be classified as nondepreciable goodwill, unless the taxpayer, in "an unusual
case," proved that the asset was not similar in character to goodwill and otherwise met
the requirements for depreciation. Rev. Rul. 74-456, 1974-2 C.B. at 66 (citations
omitted).
87 See Morning Ledger, 113 S. Ct. at 1678-79.
88 537 F.2d 446 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
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insurance expirations8 9 acquired in the purchase of an existing insurance agency.9 ° Finding in favor of the taxpayer, the court upheld the recommended decision of the trial judge. 91
The Miller court relied largely upon the taxpayer's ability to
establish an ascertainable useful life for the asset represented by
the entirety of the expirations purchased.9 2 According to the
89 The court defined an "insurance expiration" as "a copy of the face of an insurance policy made when the policy is issued" that showed "the name of the insured,
address, type of insurance, premium, carrier, property covered, and expiration date."
Id. at 450. The value of an insurance expiration, the court noted, was that it provided
the agent with the policy expiration date, which indicated the best time to solicit a
renewal of a given policy. Id. at 449, 452.
90 Id. The Miller & Sons Insurance Agency purchased the entire business of the
Arch Insurance Agency (Arch), including the goodwill and all its books and records.
Id. at 449. The purchase, however, did not include Arch's office furniture, equipment, or other tangible property. Id. at 454. The exclusion of these assets from the
purchase, the court observed, indicated Miller & Son's primary objective was not the
purchase of a going-concern business. Id.
Because the goodwill associated with the insurance business was transferred with
the insurance expirations, the court concluded the burden of proving depreciability
would be heavier than in Houston Chronicle. Id. at 452. Moreover, the court expounded that the Miller fact pattern could be distinguished from situations where the
purchased business had no goodwill due to the poor condition of the business, where
it had completely ceased business or where it had abandoned only a line of business.
Id. In such situations, the court implied, the burden on the taxpayer would be easier.
Id.
91 Id. at 449. Emphasizing the factual nature of the analysis, the court first found
that Miller & Sons had shown that the value of the insurance expirations were separate and distinct from goodwill. Id. at 452-54. The court supported this conclusion by
observing that Miller & Sons did not extensively use the name of the purchased business, Arch Insurance Agency, its sales personnel or office procedures, after the
purchase. Id. Next, the claims court found that based upon statistical evidence supplied by the taxpayer, the asset was demonstrably a "wasting asset." Id. at 454-55.
Thus, the court ruled that Miller & Sons had proven that the asset had an ascertainable useful life. Id. at 456. Finally, the court found that the depreciable value of the
asset was the cost that Miller & Sons would have incurred in generating an equal
amount of new business. Id. This value could be calculated, the court continued, by
reviewing the actual total costs Miller & Sons had incurred in soliciting new customers, dividing those costs by the number of new policies successfully solicited, and multiplying the resulting unit cost by the number of expirations acquired from Arch. Id.
at 456-57.
92 Id. at 454-56. The court identified the presence of an ascertainable useful life as
the most important factor in determining whether an intangible asset can be separated from goodwill. Id. at 452. To prove the useful life, the taxpayer introduced
statistical evidence of insurance policy renewal rates for the agency during the five
year period following the acquisition. Id. at 454-55, 456. The court accepted this
hindsight information as valid. Id. at 455.
As in Houston Chronicleand Golden State, the Miller court also addressed the massasset rule. Id. at 451-52. The court only applied the rule, however, to establish that
the expirations, viewed as a whole, were a single inseparable asset, as opposed to a
collection of individual assets. Id. The purpose of the rule, the Court of Claims concluded, was to prevent taxpayers from taking a deduction each time an individual
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Court of Claims, this demonstration, combined with a showing of
an ascertainable value of the asset, would prove that the asset was
not inextricably tied to goodwill.9" Having met the above require94
ments, the court allowed Miller & Sons to depreciate the asset.
Much of the more recent litigation pertaining to the depreciation of customer-based intangibles has concerned the banking industry.9 5 For example, in Citizens & Southern Corp. v.
Commissioner,96 the United States Tax Court, after an exhaustive factual analysis," concluded that the taxpayer should be allowed to
depreciate acquired core deposit base intangibles.9" Citizens &
Southern had claimed depreciation deductions on its 1982 tax return with respect to core deposit base intangibles of nine banks it
had acquired during 1981 and 1982. 9" The tax court treated the
ability of the taxpayer to distinguish a customer-based intangible
asset from goodwill as a threshold matter.1"' After finding that Citpolicy was not renewed upon expiration. Id. at 451. Thus, following Houston Chronicle, the court determined that the mass-asset rule did not prevent depreciation of an
intangible asset as a matter of law, and that a taxpayer able to meet the two-pronged
test of Houston Chroniclewould be entitled to depreciate the asset notwithstanding the
mass-asset rule. Id. at 452.
93 Id. at 456.
94 Id. at 457.
95 See, e.g., Colorado Nat'l Bankshares, Inc. v. Commissioner, 60 T.C.M. (CCH)
771, 795 (1990) (ruling on the depreciability of a core deposit base intangible), af'd,
984 F.2d 383 (10th Cir. 1993); IT&S of Iowa, Inc. v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 496, 513,
533 (1991) (same); Citizens & Southern Corp. v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 463, 514
(1988) (same), afJ'd, 919 F.2d 1492 (lth Cir. 1990); Banc One Corp. v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 476, 459-501 (1985) (same), aftd, 815 F.2d 75 (6th Cir. 1987) ; AmSouth Bancorporation and Subsidiaries v. United States, 681 F. Supp. 698, 698, 720
(N.D. Ala. 1988) (same).
96 91 T.C. 463 (1988), affd, 919 F.2d 1492 (11th Cir. 1990).
97 The court's statement of the facts alone covered over fifteen pages, Id. at 46479. The majority then used thirty-five pages in applying the law to the facts. Id. at
479-514.
98 Id. at 505, 514. The intangible asset, "core deposit base," is defined as the present value of the future stream of income expected to be derived through the servicing, use, and investment of the core deposits of a purchased bank. Id. at 465-66.
Core deposits are liabilitiesrepresented by the deposits held in the bank and include
regular savings, demand deposit (checking), and time deposit accounts. Id. at 465;
Cleary, supra note 3, at 795 & n.4. To the purchaser of a bank, core deposits represent an asset because they are a reliable, low cost source of funds for the bank to
invest. Citizens & Southern, 91 T.C. at 465.
99 Citizens & Southern, 91 T.C. at 466, 478. The IRS disallowed those depreciation
deductions, and the ensuing dispute culminated in the Tax Court litigation. Id. at
467, 478.
100 Id. at 480. The court impliedly rejected Citizens & Southern's argument that
the IRS was prohibited from labeling core deposit base as goodwill because the Internal Revenue Code and Regulations did not define such deposits as goodwill. Id. The
court maintained that prior case law provided a cognizable definition of goodwill, and
that Citizens & Southern was required to prove that core deposit base, as it pertained
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izens & Southern had crossed this threshold, 11 the court then applied the two-pronged test of Houston Chronicle,stressing the factual
nature of the issue.10 2 In applying the first prong of that test, the
Tax Court ruled that to qualify for depreciation, a taxpayer need
not establish an exact useful life of the asset, but simply a reasonable approximation. 1 °3 Citizens & Southern, the court determined, had shown that the life of its core deposit bases could be
reasonably estimated, based upon the multitude of factual informato Citizens & Southern, were separate and distinct from goodwill before proceeding to
the remainder of the two-part Houston Chronicle test. Id. at 479-80.
101 Id. at 500. In ruling that Citizens & Southern had proven that its core deposit
base was separate and distinct from goodwill, the court emphasized that the acquisition of the core deposits had played a significant role in Citizens & Southern's decision to acquire the banks. Id. at 498. The availability of three separate statistical
techniques that could be used to value the asset as evidence also persuaded the court.
Id. Additionally, the court noted that Citizens & Southern had presented evidence
from regulatory authorities and generally accepted accounting principles that recognized core deposits as a separate asset from goodwill. Id. at 496-98.
The court rejected the Government's arguments in support of the premise that
core deposit base was inseparable from goodwill. See generally id. at 481-95. The Government first argued that core deposits were inseparable from goodwill because they
constituted a component of the purchased bank's customer relationship. Id. at 481.
The Government relied on AmSouth Bancorporationand Subsidiaries v. United States, in
which the district court had ruled that a deposit base intangible was too closely linked
to goodwill to be depreciable. Id. (citing AmSouth Bancorporation and Subsidiaries
v. United States, 681 F. Supp. 698, 719-20 (N.D. Ala. 1988)). The court rejected this
argument, however, distinguishing AmSouth on a factual basis. Id.
The IRS alternatively argued that terminable at-will customer relationships such
as bank deposits were goodwill as a matter of law. Id. at 483. The court also rejected
this argument, stating that such a rule could not be derived from the cases cited by
the IRS, and confirmed that the nature of the asset remained a question of fact. Id. at
483-86.
The Government also argued that the asset should be considered goodwill because the bank's expenses in soliciting and maintaining the deposit relationships had
been deducted, rather than capitalized, for income tax purposes. Id. at 490. According to the Government, tax law provides that any expenditure which enhances a separate and distinct asset must be capitalized. Id. (citation omitted). Therefore, argued
the Government, because the banks deducted the expenditures, it was inconsistent
for Citizens & Southern to argue that they could have created an asset separate from
goodwill. Id. at 491. The court dismissed this argument, distinguishing internallycreated assets from purchased assets such as those at issue in Citizens & Southern. Id. at
491.
Finally, the Government argued that Citizens & Southern had allocated an excessive amount to the value of the deposit base. Id. at 493. This allocation, according to
the Government, resulted in Citizens & Southern recording as goodwill an amount
far less than that evidenced by the facts of the case. Id. The court disposed of this
argument because it was only relevant to whether Citizens & Southern had assigned
the proper values to deposit base and goodwill once the taxpayer had shown them to
be distinguishable, rather than whether the deposit base was distinguishable from
goodwill. Id.
102 Id. at 486, 500.
103 Id. at 500 (quotation omitted).
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tion it had presented.
The court further concluded that Citizens & Southern had satisfied the second prong of the Houston Chronicletest.'" 5 Citizens &
Southern accomplished this, the court found, by using valuation
analyses, supported by an independent expert valuation. 10 6 Ruling
that Citizens & Southern had met all of the factual and evidentiary
requirements, the court allowed Citizens & Southern's depreciation deductions.1l ' Relying on the tax court's opinion, the United
104 Id. at 500-05. Citizens & Southern estimated the lives of the deposit accounts
using statistical studies that gathered information regarding account closings in the
period immediately preceding Citizens & Southern's acquisition of the banks. Id. at
500. Based upon the results of these studies, Citizens & Southern produced runoff
tables that projected future account closings for each of the acquired banks. Id. at
500-01. Citizens & Southern further supported its estimation of useful life with an
expert statistician's independent analysis to confirm the reasonableness and statistical
soundness of the lifing studies. Id. Finally, Citizens & Southern conducted follow-up
studies during the years following the acquisitions to buttress the reasonableness of its
estimates. Id. at 501-02.
The IRS argued that the taxpayer's methodology failed to consider several pertinent factors. Id. at 502-05. First, the IRS claimed that Citizens & Southern's analysis
ignored the balances of individual accounts and instead improperly focused on the
raw number of accounts at each of the acquired banks. Id. at 502. Second, asserted
the Service, Citizens & Southern did not incorporate a growth factor as to the balances of the accounts, either as a group or individually. Id. at 502-03. Third, the
Government argued that Citizens & Southern had failed to consider the deregulation
of the banking industry during the period in question and the resulting effect upon
depositors' banking habits. Id. at 504. Finally, the Government contended that the
taxpayer had not stratified the accounts in enough detail to provide sufficient data
upon which to base an accurate useful life projection. Id. at 505. The court rejected
each of these arguments, citing Citizens & Southern's follow-up study and other analyses that demonstrated that the incorporation of a growth factor would have had a
negligible effect on the original study. Id. at 502-05.
105 Id. at 510.
106 Id. at 505-10. Similar to the statistical analysis used in estimating the useful lives
of the deposit accounts, Citizens & Southern used the lifing studies to value the assets.
Id. at 505. The account balances for each future year were projected based upon the
estimated lives of the accounts. Id. at 505-06. These projected balances were then
multiplied by a percentage rate that would account for the net income flow derived
from those balances. Id. at 506. This future net income stream was then discounted
to present value to arrive at the valuation of the asset. Id.
107 Id. at 514. Two separate dissents took issue with the majority's decision. See id.
at 517-19 (Chabot, J., dissenting); it. at 519-24 (Williams, J., dissenting). One dissentingjudge contended that because core deposits were liabilities, Citizens & Southern
had not acquired a depreciable asset but simply a liability worth less than its face
amount. Id. at 518 (Chabot, J., dissenting). A second dissenter argued that core deposits were still inextricably tied to goodwill because the "opportunity to arbitrage"
was not the only element of the value of core deposits. Id. at 519 (Williams, J., dissenting). Judge Williams maintained that the majority's finding that core deposits would
contribute to the growth of the bank indicated that a significant part of the total value
of core deposits was the expectancy of continued patronage. Id. at 519-20 (Williams,
J., dissenting) (quoting Houston Chronicle Publishing Co. v. United States, 481 F.2d
1240, 1247 (5th Cir. 1973)). This connection, continued Judge Williams, was too
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States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.' 0 8
In Colorado National Bankshares, Inc. v. Commissioner,"9 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit followed the
lead of the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Citizens & Southern.10 In
a case almost factually identical to Citizens & Southern, the Tenth
Circuit affirmed the tax court's ruling that permitted a taxpayer to
depreciate core deposit intangibles with respect to seven acquired
banks."' The tax court had found that the core deposit accounts
acquired by Colorado National Bankshares (Bankshares)" 2 could
be identified, and estimated with reasonable accuracy.1 3 Noting
strong to support a finding that deposit base was separate and distinct from goodwill.
Id. at 520 (Williams, J., dissenting). In a concurring opinion,Judge Cohen countered
this argument by noting that Judge Williams had proffered no authority for the assertion that no asset could be deemed separate and distinct from goodwill unless the
entire value of the asset was unrelated to customers' continued patronage. Id. at 515
(Cohen, J., concurring).
The commentary on this case has generally supported the majority. See Cleary,
supra note 3, at 829 (arguing that the key issue in the depreciation of core deposit
base is not whether the asset resembles the expectation of continued patronage, but
whether the asset has a limited useful life); cf Meehan, supra note 3, at 593 (criticizing
the Tax Court for requiring separability from goodwill as a precondition to depreciation of customer-based intangibles, and arguing that ascertainable cost basis and useful life alone satisfy the requirements of the regulations).
108 Citizens & Southern Corp. v. Commissioner, 919 F.2d 1492 (11th Cir. 1990). See
supra note 53 (describing this case as a contribution to the conflict between the circuits which eventually led to the Supreme Court granting certiorari to Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1583 (1992)).
109 984 F.2d 383 (10th Cir. 1993), affg, 60 T.C.M. (CCH) 771 (1990).
110 Id. at 384, 386, 387 (citations omitted).
I Id. Bankshares was so similar to Citizens & Southern that at least one commentator analyzed the two cases and their impact together in a single article. Meehan, supra
note 3, at 578.
112 Colorado National Bankshares (Bankshares) was a Colorado corporation that
owned a substantial portion of the stock in thirteen commercial banks. Bankshares, 60
T.C.M. (CCH) at 771. In 1981 and 1982, Bankshares acquired seven banks in the
Front Range region of Colorado. Id. The Front Range region consisted of ten counties near the eastern side of the Rocky Mountains in Colorado. Id. Approximately
80% of Colorado's population resided in this area during the 1980's. Id.
113 Id. at 789. To meet the first prong of the Houston Chronicle test, Bankshares
relied on Citizens & Southern, arguing that its lifing studies were similar to those conducted by Citizens & Southern. Id. at 790. Bankshares also conducted follow-up studies, a tactic that had assisted Citizens & Southern in meeting the test. Id.; Citizens &
Southern Corp. v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 463, 501-02 (1988). The Commissioner
attempted to persuade the court to distinguish Bankshares's evidence from that
presented by Citizens & Southern. Bankshares, 60 T.C.M. (CCH) at 790-91; Citizens &
Southern, 91 T.C. at 502-05. Specifically, the Commissioner argued that because Bankshares had conducted lifing studies at some but not all of the acquired banks, the
estimates of the useful lives of the deposit accounts at the banks not studied were
based on inadequate factual proof. Id. at 790, 791. The court disagreed, noting that
"a taxpayer may establish the useful life of an asset for depreciation purposes based
on his own experience with similar property or, if his experience is inadequate, based
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that goodwill, by definition, has an indefinite useful life, the tax
court ruled that the core deposits acquired by Bankshares were
separate and distinct from goodwill because useful lives of the assets had been established.1 14 Further, the tax court essentially endorsed Bankshares' method of valuing the core deposit intangibles
and the taxpayer's amortization schedules for the assets.11 5 Therefore, the court allowed Bankshares' depreciation of the core deposit intangible assets. 116
In Donrey, Inc. v. United States,'1 7 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit used an approach similar to that in
Houston Chronicle to determine the depreciability of a newspaper
subscription list.11 Donrey, Inc., the taxpayer, attempted to depreon industry experience in general." Id. at 791 (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-1(b)).
The remainder of the Government's arguments on this issue were similar or identical
to those it advanced in Citizens & Southern, and the Tax Court disposed of them in a
similar fashion. See id. at 790-91 (analyzing and refuting each of the Government's
arguments); supranote 104 (outlining the Government's arguments presented in Citizens and Southern regarding the Houston Chronice test). As a result, the court ruled that
Bankshares's core deposit intangible had a limited, ascertainable useful life. Bankshares, 60 T.C.M. (CCH) at 792.
114 Bankshares, 60 T.C.M. (CCH) at 789. In Bankshares, as in Citizens &Southern, the
Tax Court treated the separability of the intangible asset from goodwill as a threshold
issue. Id. at 787-89. Bankshares relied primarily upon Citizens & Southern to cross this
threshold. Id. at 788. Bankshares also supplemented the authority of Citizens &
Southern with evidence that generally accepted accounting principles, the Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency (the agency charged with the regulation of national
banks), and the Securities and Exchange Commission all recognized core deposit intangibles as assets separate and distinct from goodwill. Id. at 788-89. Although the
court acknowledged that core deposit intangibles were closely related to goodwill, it
agreed with Bankshares that the asset was, nonetheless, separate and distinct. Id. at
790.
115 Id. at 791-95. As to the second prong of the Houston Chronicletest, the Tax Court
ordered a slight change in the valuation method of the core deposit base proposed by
the taxpayer. Id. at 794. The result, the court proffered, would conform the methodology used to value Bankshares's core deposit intangibles with the procedure endorsed in Citizens & Southern. Id. at 792-94.
116 Id. at 795.

809 F.2d 534 (8th Cir. 1987).
118 Id. at 536-37. Addressing a fact pattern similar to Morning Ledger, the Eighth
Circuit in Donrey applied precedent set by Houston Chronicle. Id. The majority in Morning Ledger called the Donrey fact pattern nearly identical to Morning Ledger. Newark
Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1670, 1679 (1993). For a discussion
of the facts in Morning Ledger see supra notes 22-35 and accompanying text. By contrast, Houston Chronicle presented a fact situation under which the distinction of the
asset from goodwill was much clearer. Cross, supra note 51, at A-19 to A-20. Because
Houston Chronicle concerned a situation in which the subscription list was purchased
with no intent of continuing publication of the paper to which the list related, the
question of continued patronage was irrelevant. Id. Conversely, because Donrey addressed a subscription list associated with an ongoing newspaper business, the separability of the list from goodwill was a more difficult factual issue than that faced by the
117
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ciate a subscription list acquired in connection with its purchase of
a going concern newspaper business. 1 19 The taxpayer argued that
the asset had a value separate and distinct from goodwill based
upon predictable increases in future advertising revenue to be derived from the list.' 20 The jury agreed and also found that the list
had an ascertainable useful life. 121 Rejecting the Government's assertion that the asset should be considered goodwill as a matter of
law, the court of appeals deferred to the jury's finding that the tax1 22
payer had satisfied the Houston Chronicle standard.
Faced with the four above-mentioned circuit decisions, and
the apparently conflicting rule adopted by the Third Circuit below,
the United States Supreme Court addressed the matter of depreciation of customer-based intangibles in Newark MorningLedger Co. v.
United States.121 Justice Blackmun, writing for a 5-4 majority, particularized the issue as whether the IRS could properly classify an asset as nondepreciable goodwill as a matter of law, despite the fact
that a taxpayer had proven the asset to have an ascertainable value
Houston Chronicle court. Id. Despite the factual difference between Houston Chronicle
and Donrey, the court used special interrogatories designed to apply the Houston
Chronicle two-pronged test. Donrey, 809 F.2d at 535, 536-37.
119 Donrey, 809 F.2d at 535. Donrey, Inc. (Donrey) had purchased the Washington
Times Herald (Washington, Indiana) in 1972. Id. Of the $1.34 million total purchase
price, Donrey allocated $559,406 to the value of the newspaper's subscription list and
claimed deductions for depreciation of the list on subsequent years' income tax returns. Id. After the Commissioner had disallowed the depreciation deduction on
Donrey's 1977 and 1978 returns, the taxpayer paid the additional tax, filed refund
claims, and brought suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of
Arkansas. Id. at 535 & n.1.
120 Id. at 535-36. The evidence demonstrated that 80% of the Times Heralds revenue came from advertising, for which the rates were determined according to the
number of subscribers. Id. The testimony of Donrey's witnesses indicated that advertisers would pay more to advertise in a newspaper with paid subscriptions than in a
paper that was distributed free, because a reader was more likely to read a newspaper
for which he had paid. Id. at 536.
121 Id. The jury found the list to have a useful life of twenty-three years. Id.
122 Id. at 536, 537. Consistent with Houston Chronicle, both parties agreed prior to
the trial that the depreciability of the subscription list hinged on the following questions of fact, to be decided by the jury: 1) whether the list had "an ascertainable value
separate and distinct from goodwill"; and 2) whether the list had a useful life which
could be reasonably estimated. Id. at 536-37 (citing Houston Chronicle Publishing
Co. v. United States, 481 F.2d 1240, 1251 (5th Cir. 1973)). The jury answered both
questions in the affirmative, agreed with Donrey's valuation, and found the useful life
of the asset to be twenty-three years. Id. at 536, 537. Considering the Government's
motions for judgement notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial, the district
court refused to disturb the jury's findings. Id. at 537. In affirming, the court of
appeals chastised the Government for attempting to assert that the asset was goodwill
as a matter of law when the Government had conceded earlier that the issue was a
question of fact. Id.
123 113 S. Ct. 1670 (1993).
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and limited useful life susceptible to reasonable estimation.1 2 4 Justice Blackmun began the Court's analysis by surveying the statutory
and judicial authority, and the underlying rationale surrounding
the deduction for depreciation. 125 The Court also noted that,
although the Service had disallowed depreciation of goodwill since
1927,126 the IRS had recognized a depreciation deduction for intangible assets since the passage of the Revenue Act of 1918.127
Against this background, Justice Blackmun laid the groundwork for a determination of what constitutes goodwill.1 2 In the
absence of a statutory definition, the Court relied upon the "short129
hand" definition-"the expectancy of continued patronage."
The Court considered this definition as a useful label for describing the totality of reasons that customers continue to do business
with the same vendors.1 3 Justice Blackmun lamented, however,
that the definition was of little value in determining whether a
given asset was depreciable, because the values of almost all intangible assets were somewhat related to the expectancy of continued
patronage."' The Court distinguished customer-based intangibles
as the most problematic category of intangible assets, noting that
copyrights and patents, with useful lives set by statute, and contractbased assets, 1 2 with lives specified by contract terms, did not pres1671-72.
Id. at 1674-75. Justice Blackmun noted that the depreciation deduction had
been available to taxpayers since 1909. Id. at 1674 (citation omitted). See also supra
note 6 (discussing the statutory history of the deduction for depreciation). The purpose of the deduction, the Court interpreted, was "to further the integrity of periodic
income statements by making a meaningful allocation of the cost entailed in the use
(excluding maintenance expense) of the asset to the periods to which it contributes."
Id. (citation omitted).
126 Id. at 1675. Prior to the decision of the Eighth Circuit in Red Wing Malting v.
Willcuts, 15 F.2d 626 (8th Cir. 1926), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 763 (1927), the IRS had
allowed for depreciation of goodwill in some very limited circumstances. Id. at 1674
n.8. See supranote 6 (discussing the few instances where deductions for goodwill had
been allowed).
127 Morning Ledger, 113 S. Ct. at 1674-75 (citing Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18,
§ 234(a) (7), 40 Stat. 1057, 1078 (1919)). See supra note 6 (citing the various Congressional reenactments with similar statutory language that pertain to this deduction).
128 Morning Ledger; 113 S. Ct. at 1675-76.
129 Id. at 1675 (citing Boe v. Commissioner, 307 F.2d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1962)).
130 Id.
131 Id. at 1675. Justice Blackmun stressed that the Court had relied on the phrase
"expectancy of continued patronage" to refer to "an intangible asset that [had] no
useful life
and no ascertainablevalue." Id. at 1676 n.9 (emphasis added).
132 "Contract-based" refers to assets such as covenants not to compete, leaseholds,
life estates, and other intangibles, the useful lives of which are expressly limited by
grant or contract. See id. at 1676 (listing several such types of intangibles).
124 Id. at
125

1993]

NOTE

1147

ent the same inherent difficulty in ascertaining useful life. 133
The Court next discussed the mass-asset rule. 3 4 Justice Blackmun acknowledged that the mass-asset rule could prohibit depreciation deductions if the intangible asset in question was determined
to be self-regenerating.1 3 5 The Court ruled, however, that under
Houston Chronicle, the IRS could not use the mass-asset rule to prohibit depreciation of customer-based intangibles as a matter of
law. 136 Justice Blackmun then confirmed the applicability of the
13 7
two-pronged Houston Chronicle test.
The Court next reviewed the major cases in which the Houston
Chronicle rule had been applied. 3 8 Stressing the factual nature of
the Court's inquiry, Justice Blackmun emphasized that each time a
court had allowed depreciation of a customer-based intangible, its
ruling had been based upon a meticulously developed factual record. 139 Carefully summarizing four decisions interpreting and applying the Houston Chronicle test, the Justice highlighted the
133 Id. As nonexclusive examples of customer-based intangibles, Justice Blackmun
listed customer lists, subscriber lists, insurance expirations, bank deposits, drugstore
prescription files and cleaning service accounts. Id.
134 Id. at 1676-78. See supra note 72 (discussing the mass-asset rule).
135 Id. at 1676. Self-regenerating refers to the phenomenon that results when old
components of a mass-asset that expire or terminate are replaced with new components due to the normal turnover of customers. Id. (quoting Golden State Towel &
Linen Serv., Ltd. v. United States, 373 F.2d 938, 944 (Ct. Cl. 1967)). This process
represents "merely the ebb and flow of a continuing property status in this species,
and does not within ordinary limits give rise to the right to deduct for tax purposes
the loss of individual customers." Id. (quoting Golden State, 373 F.2d at 944). Despite
the Third Circuit's comment that the mass-asset rule was outdated, the Supreme
Court noted that the rule had been used to deny depreciation deductions as recently
as 1991. Id. at 1677 (citing Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 945 F.2d
555, 561 (1991)); see e.g. Ithaca Indus., Inc. v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 253, 267, 272
(1991) (holding that an asset, entitled "assembled work force," was nondepreciable
due to its self-regenerating characteristics).
136 Morning Ledger, 113 S. Ct. at 1677. Justice Blackmun stated that Houston Chronicle had ended any doubt on the permissibility of a per se rule of nondepreciability for
mass-assets. Id. at 1676-77. Justice Blackmun further noted that the IRS itself had
responded to Houston Chronicle by conceding that customer-based intangibles were
not nondepreciable as a matter of law. Id. (citing Rev. Rul. 74-456, 1974-2 C.B. 65,
66). The Court pointed out, however, that because the taxpayer in Houston Chronicle
had no intention of continuing publication of the purchased newspaper, the intangible asset in that case could not possibly have been self-regenerating. Id. at 1677.
137 Id. Reiterating the test, the Justice stressed that a taxpayer could depreciate an
intangible asset if the asset "1) has an ascertainable value separate and distinct from
goodwill, and 2) has a limited useful life, the duration of which can be ascertained
with reasonable accuracy." Id. (quoting Houston Chronicle Publishing Co. v. United
States, 481 F.2d 1240, 1250 (5th Cir. 1973)). See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying
text for a detailed discussion of the Houston Chronicle test.
138 Morning Ledger, 113 S. Ct. at 1678-79.
139 Id. at 1678.
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important facts each case relied upon when allowing depreciation. 14 Specifically, the Court noted that each case had involved a
customer-based mass-asset, and that each court had ruled that the
taxpayer had discharged its burden of proof by showing that the
had a limited useful life and was not selfasset in question
14 1
regenerating.
Justice Blackmun subtly criticized the Third Circuit for failing
to give appropriate weight to cases such as Miller & Sons, Citizens &
Southern, Bankshares, and Donrey.1 42 The Justice further chided the
readiness of the court of appeals to classify assets as goodwill and
hold them nondepreciable simply because of their relationship to
the expectancy of continued patronage.143 To the contrary, the
Court observed no reason for such categorization where the asset
could be shown to have an ascertainable useful life and a determinable value.' 4 4 The Court agreed with the Third Circuit that the
burden of proof would often prove too difficult for taxpayers to
overcome.' 45 The majority ruled, however, that the law must leave
room for taxpayers who can prove, as a matter of 46fact, that their
particular asset could be separated from goodwill.'
To support this portion of the holding, Justice Blackmun referred to the rationale behind the historical prohibition of the depreciation of goodwill.1 47 Citing Miller & Sons, as well as the
Id. at 1678-79. Specifically, the Court surveyed Richard S. Miller & Sons, Inc. v.
United States, 537 F.2d 446 (Ct. Cl. 1976); Citizens & Southern Corp. v. Commissioner, 91
T.C. 463 (1988), affd, 919 F.2d 1492 (1 lth Cir. 1990); ColoradoNat'l Bankshares,Inc. v.
Commissioner,60 T.C.M. (CCH) 771 (1990), affd, 984 F.2d 383 (10th Cir. 1993); and
Donrey, Inc. v. United States, 809 F.2d 534 (8th Cir. 1987). Id. See supra notes 88-122
and accompanying text for a discussion of these cases.
141 Morning Ledger, 113 S. Ct. at 1678-79.
142 Id. at 1679 n.12 (citation omitted). The Justice referred to the criticism of a
commentator who had disagreed with the Third Circuit's dismissal of those cases as a
"minority strand" of the authority. Id. (citing Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Newark Morning
Ledger: A Threat To The Amortizability Of Acquired Intangibles, 55 TAX NoTES 981, 984
(1992)); see also Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 945 F.2d 555, 565 (3d
Cir. 1991) (referring to the cases relied upon by the district court as a minority). AviYonah noted that the Third Circuit had cited fourteen cases in this area decided after
Houston Chronicle, of which the IRS had won only six. Avi-Yonah, supra, at 984. Instead of dwelling on whether Miller & Sons, Citizens & Southern, Bankshares,and Donrey
constituted a majority, however, the Court simply agreed with those cases, stating:
"Regardless of whether the cases are characterized as a 'minority strand' or as a 'modem trend,' we find their reasoning and approach persuasive." Morning Ledger, 113 S.
Ct. at 1680 n.12.
143 Morning Ledger, 113 S. Ct. at 1680.
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Id.
140
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Government's own brief, Justice Blackmun reasoned that the only
real justification for refusing to allow depreciation of goodwill was
that by definition, goodwill had an indefinite useful life.14 8 The
"matching principle,"1 49 which underlies all of tax law, the Court
continued, was more properly served by allowing depreciation de1 50
ductions where the useful life of an asset could be ascertained.
Thus, Justice Blackmun concluded, the relevant question to determine whether an intangible is depreciable was not whether the asset possessed any of the characteristics of goodwill, but simply
whether it had an ascertainable value and limited useful life.1 51
Having adopted the above rule, the Court again stressed that
the taxpayers' burden of proof in securing deductions for depreciation of customer-based intangibles was not insignificant.'5 2 Justice
Blackmun hinted that the Government might even have won its
case against Morning Ledger had it adopted a different trial strategy. ' The Court noted that the Government had stipulated that
in the event the Court found the asset depreciable, the useful
lives
used by Morning Ledger could be assumed to be accurate. 5 4 This
148 Id. (citing Richard S. Miller & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 537 F.2d 446, 450 (Ct.
Cl. 1967); Brief for Respondent at 13, Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States,
113 S.Ct. 1670 (1993) (No. 91-1135)). The Court traced this reasoning to Red Wing
Malting Co. v. Willcuts, the case that established the nondepreciability of goodwill. Id.
(citing Red Wing Malting Co. v. Willcuts, 15 F.2d 626, 633 (8th Cir. 1926)). In Red
Wing Malting the Eighth Circuit stated: "As good will does not suffer wear and tear,
does not become obsolescent, is not used up in the operation of the business, depreciation, as such, cannot be charged against it." Red Wing Malting, 15 F.2d at 633; see also
5 MERTENS LAw OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 23.01, at 7 (Cum. Supp. 1993) (asserting that goodwill is not amortizable because "its useful life cannot be ascertained
with reasonable accuracy").
149 Under the matching principle, a court attempts to ensure that expenses are
deducted in the same taxable year as the income to which those deductions are attributable. Morning Ledger, 113 S.Ct. at 1680 (quoting INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner,
113 S.Ct. 1039, 1043 (1992)). In INDOPCO, the Supreme Court found expenditures
for professional fees made in connection with a friendly takeover to be nondeductible
capital expenditures. IMDOPCO Inc., 113 S. Ct. at 1045, 1046. The INDOPCOCourt
based this finding on the Tax Court's conclusion that the benefits to accrue from the
expenditures extended well beyond the taxable year for which the taxpayer claimed a
deduction. Id. at 1045. Capitalization of these expenditures was more appropriate,
the Court reasoned, because doing so resulted in a more accurate matching of the
deduction of the expenditures to the attributable revenues. Id. at 1043, 1045. Therefore, the Court posited that capitalization resulted in a more appropriate calculation
of net income for tax purposes, based on established tax accounting principles. Id. at
1045.
150 Morning Ledger, 113 S. Ct. at 1680.
151 Id. at 1681 (quotation omitted).

152

Id.

Id. at 1681-82 & n.14. Declaring "[t]his case was lost at trial[,]" the Justice's critique of the Government's litigation strategy left no room for misinterpretation. Id.
154 Id. at 1681.
153
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action, the Court hypothesized, greatly lightened Morning
Ledger's burden of proof.'5 5 This was true, the Court noted, because, as the district judge had observed, Morning Ledger was required to prove only that the paid subscribers asset had a useful life
that was susceptible to reasonable estimation."6 Accordingly, the
Court disposed of the first prong of the Houston Chronicle test by
deferring to the district court's factual findings.' 5 7 Specifically, the
Court ruled that Morning Ledger had satisfied the test by showing
at trial that experts could reasonably estimate the useful lives of the
paid subscribers and by establishing that the asset was not selfregenerating. 1s
Justice Blackmun then moved to the second prong of the
Houston Chronicle test, which related to the valuation of the asset.' 59
The Court weighed the income method of valuation advocated by
Morning Ledger against the cost savings method preferred by the
Government."6 Justice Blackmun agreed with the taxpayer's
method, maintaining that the seasoned subscribers included in the
paid subscribers asset were not comparable to newly-generated subscriptions. 6 1 Accordingly, the Court determined the income apId.
Id. Thus, the Court acknowledged that the stipulation relieved Morning Ledger
of the burden of proving that its estimates were reasonable. Id. Specifically, the district court stated: "Because of the stipulation reached by the parties, Morning Ledger
need not prove either the specific useful lives of the paid subscriber of the Booth
newspapers as of May 31, 1977, or that Dr. Glasser [its statistical expert] has correctly
estimated those lives." Id. (quoting Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States,
734 F. Supp. 176, 181 (1990)).
157 Id.
158 Id. The district ruled that although the overall level of subscribers had remained stable, the new subscribers who replaced those terminating their subscriptions were obtained through significant efforts by the taxpayer. Id. (citing Morning
Ledger, 734 F. Supp. at 180). These new subscribers, the Supreme Court noted, had
no effect on the 460,000 paid subscribers who represented a finite number of subscriptions in existence as of the measurement date. Id. Thus, the Court agreed with
the district court's finding that the asset was not self-regenerating and removed the
case from the application of the mass-asset rule. Id. (citing Morning Ledger, 734 F.
Supp. at 180).
155
156

159 Id. at 1682-83.

160 Id. at 1673, 1682. In applying the income approach, Morning Ledger utilized
the independent concurring opinions of two experts. Id. Under the Government's
proposed approach, the value of the asset would have been only the cost which would
have been incurred in generating a similar number of new subscriptions. Id. at 1682.
Any value over this amount, the Government argued, would include value attributable
to the expectancy of continued patronage and should be classified as nondepreciable
goodwill. Id.
161 Id. Justice Blackmun distinguished the existing paid subscribers from new subscribers on the predictability and reliability of the income stream to be derived from
each group. Id. The Court therefore determined that the cost approach was irrele-
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proach was the proper method of valuation. 16 2
Because the Government had not presented evidence to dispute Morning Ledger's actual valuation under the income
method, the Court again deferred to the district court's acceptance
of Morning Ledger's valuation. 163 As a result, Justice Blackmun
concluded that Morning Ledger not only had proven that the asset
had an ascertainable value, but also had determined what the value
was, and thus had met the second prong of the Houston Chronicle
test. 1

The Justice then reiterated the Court's ruling that the mere
relationship of the asset to the expectancy of continued patronage
did not automatically result in the classification of the asset as nondepreciable goodwill. 165 This relationship, the Court concluded,
was irrelevant in determining the depreciability of the asset, provided that the taxpayer could prove that the asset had a limited
useful life. 166 In so finding, the Court reversed the judgment of
the Third Circuit, and remanded the case for implementation of
1 67
the Supreme Court's ruling.

Justice Souter, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
White and Scalia, dissented.16 The dissent took issue with the majority on two separate points. 69 First, Justice Souter disputed the
majority's decision to adopt the residual definition of goodwill. 170
Second, theJustice contested the majority's finding that, under the
residual definition, Morning Ledger had met its evidentiary burden of proving that the paid subscribers asset had a limited useful
life which could be estimated with reasonable accuracy. 1 7 1
With respect to the dissent's first contention, Justice Souter
argued that by accepting Morning Ledger's invitation to adopt the
residual definition, the Court was abandoning sixty-five years of setvant in these circumstances because the paid subscribers and newly generated subscribers represented "entirely different asset[s]." Id.
162 Id. at 1682-83.
163 Id.
164 Id.
165
166
167
168
169
170

Id. at 1683.

Id.

Id.
Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 1684 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter interpreted the residual definition of goodwill as "any portion of a business's purchase price not attributable to
identifiable assets with determinate lives." Id. Under this definition, observed the
Justice, "[g]oodwill would shrink to an accounting leftover." Id. at 1684-85 (Souter,J.,
dissenting).
171 Id. at 1683, 1684, 1686 (SouterJ., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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tled precedent. 172 Compounding this mistake, continued the Justice, was the fact that Congress had presumptively approved of the
Treasury's interpretation of the depreciation statute 1 73 by reenacting the law several times without modifying the prohibition of de174
preciation of goodwill.
Contrary to the majority, Justice Souter contended that the accepted definition of goodwill-the expectancy of continued patronage-precluded Morning Ledger from depreciating its paid
subscribers asset. 175 This result, argued the Justice, was inevitable
which
because paid subscribers fell squarely within that definition,
76
the dissent and the majority agreed was nondepreciable.1
Justice Souter premised his second argument upon a hypothetical acceptance of the majority's "mistake" in adopting the
residual definition of goodwill.1 7 7 Even under the residual definition, Justice Souter insisted, Morning Ledger had failed to prove
the useful life of the paid subscribers with the required degree of
accuracy. 17" Further, the Justice contended that the Government
had not conceded this issue by stipulation, nor had Morning
Ledger even attempted to prove the life properly. 79 Instead, sub172 Id. at 1685 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter cited to the history of the
depreciation statute and the related treasury regulations interpreting the statute to
support his contention. Id. (citation omitted). See supra note 6 (discussing the history
of the depreciation of intangible assets).
173 The Treasury Regulations represent the IRS's interpretation of the statute.
BLACK'S LAw DIcTONARY 1286-87 (6th ed. 1990).
174 Morning Ledger, 113 S. Ct. at 1685 (Souter, J., dissenting). The dissent argued
that, irrespective of Congress's approval, the regulation itself was entitled to deference from the Court as long it reasonably implemented Congress's intent underlying
the statute. Id. at 1685-86 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
175 Id. at 1685, 1686 (Souter,J., dissenting). The majority characterized this definition as the "shorthand" definition of goodwill, but admitted that the definition was of
little value in resolving the issues presented in the case at hand. Id. at 1675 (citation
omitted).
176 Id. at 1684 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 1675-76. The majority conceded that
the asset was related to goodwill, but concluded that relation to goodwill did not
preclude depreciation because almost every intangible asset was related to goodwill.
Id. at 1675-76. Justice Souter disagreed, alleging that the asset was goodwill and therefore was nondepreciable. Id. at 1685 n.4 (Souter, J., dissenting).
177 Id. at 1686 (Souter, J., dissenting).
178 Id. Justice Souter explained that to meet its burden, Morning Ledger should
have proven that the asset it sought to depreciate was purchased in the Booth Merger
and not attributable to any events subsequent to Herald's acquisition of Booth. Id.
179 Id. at 1686-87 (Souter, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). Instead, argued Justice Souter, Morning Ledger's expert had made questionable assumptions in estimating the useful life of the acquired newspapers' subscriber relationships. Id. at 1687
(Souter, J., dissenting). Implicit in those assumptions, according to the dissent, was
that the new owners of the newspapers would continue to manage the business as it
had been managed prior to the acquisition. Id. at 1687-88 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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mitted Justice Souter, Morning Ledger had merely established the
estimated duration of the subscriber relationship, and not the useful life of the actual asset purchased from Booth.18 0 Consequently,
Justice Souter concluded that Morning Ledger prevailed only because the majority confused the duration of the subscriber relationship with the asset actually purchased, which was only a
component of that relationship.'
Based upon the above analysis, Justice Souter agreed with the
Third Circuit that the paid subscribers should have been classified
would
as nondepreciable goodwill. 182 Accordingly, the1 8 dissent
3
have affirmed the holding of the court of appeals.
Despite 'the recent enactment of the Revenue Reconciliation
Act of 1993, the decision of the Supreme Court in Morning Ledger
has impacted and will continue to impact the treatment of past
acquisitions and the resolution of disputes between taxpayers and
the IRS. First, perhaps the decision-especially the rift between
the majority and the dissent-convinced Congress of the need to
settle the matter conclusively by enacting a clear set of rules for the
depreciation of intangibles.1 4 New Internal Revenue Code Section 197 does so by providing clear guidelines for the depreciation
of nearly all purchased intangible assets over a uniform depreciable life. Section 197 will leave little room for controversy under the
residual method of purchase price allocation because the need for
allocation of value between different intangibles has been nearly
eliminated. Thus, the new law regarding intangibles will eliminate
This assumption, contended Justice Souter, illustrated that Morning Ledger's purported estimates of useful lives were really estimates of the duration of the subscriber
relationships, based not only upon the value acquired from Booth, but also upon the
value to be generated by future actions of management. Id. at 1688 (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
180 Id.

181 Id. at 1689 (Souter, J., dissenting).
182 Id.
183 Id.

184 See H.R. REP. No. 213, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 673 (1993). In the bill proposing
§ 197 of the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993, the Conference Managers specifically referred to Morning Ledger. See H.R. REP. No. 111, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 760
(1993) (commenting that much of the controversy in this area would be eliminated
by specifying a single amortization method and amortizable life for all amortizable
intangible assets and by treating goodwill as such an asset). Moreover, the Managers
expressed concern over the majority's statement that the burden on the taxpayer to
meet the test for depreciability would "often prove too difficult to bear." Id. (citing
Morning Ledger, 113 S. Ct. at 1681). Additionally, one commentator predicted (perhaps correctly) that the enactment of the new law would serve as a means of limiting
the revenue loss resulting from the Morning Ledger decision. Persellin, supra note 14,
at 215.
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costly litigation expenses for both taxpayers and the Government
and free up resources on both sides for more productive activities.
Second, the decision in Morning Ledger clarifies the law applicable to deductions arising out of past transactions, including
those currently before the courts or under IRS audit or appeal, and
those for which audits have yet to begin.1" 5 Morning Ledger, combined with the urging of the Conference Committee to settle cases
in this area quickly, should provide needed momentum toward the
closing of a multitude of disputed cases. Cases currently on court
dockets are more likely to be settled, and those currently under
audit or appeal are less likely to be litigated.' 8 Again, the result
will be a significant savings of costs and resources on both sides of
the controversy.
Despite the irony that Congress finally decided to settle the
issue only after the Supreme Court had taken the opportunity to
do so, the recent developments in the law regarding the depreciation of intangible assets seem to have simplified an area historically
riddled with troublesome controversy. This rare but welcome nugget of "tax simplification" should be used as an example by Congress and the courts for the elimination of other areas of seemingly
endless disputes between taxpayers and the Service.
Steven E. Coleman

185 See Persellin, supra note 14, at 211 (observing that the Morning Ledger decision
would effect the outcome of disputes currently in litigation or under audit). But see
H.R. REP. No. 111, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 760 (1993) (noting that absent new law, such
disputes would continue to arise even after the Morning Ledger decision); Levy et al.,
supra note 3, at 4 (arguing that the result in Morning Ledger would actually lead to
further disputes because the decision merely shifted the focal point of the controversy
from whether the asset was goodwill to whether the taxpayer's estimates of useful life
and value were accurate).
186 See Brian R. Greenstein, The Depreciation of Customer Based Intangible assets, 20 J.
CoRP.TAX'N 315, 325 (1994) (predicting that, although the Service would be unlikely
to concede disputed cases, taxpayers could expect to find the IRS more willing to
compromise).
The IRS's acting Chief Counsel, in response to the decision in Morning Ledger,
sent a memorandum to field offices in June, 1993, instructing agents to place many
cases in abeyance pending advice from the National Office. IntangiblesSettlement Still
in Works at IRS; Decision Likely Soon, Official Says, DAiLY TAX REPORT (BNA), October
15, 1993, at G-7. As of October, 1993, the IRS was considering four alternative approaches to settling outstanding cases. The options under consideration include allowing taxpayers amortization similar to that allowed prospectively under I.R.C. § 197.
Id. Other options would involve employment of cost-recovery formulas based, perhaps, upon probable results of litigation. Id.

